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PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF OUTER SPACE CONFLICTS
THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE:
"THE LINE OF LEAST RESISTANCE"
GEORGE PAUL SLOUP*
INTRODUCTION
IMON NEWCOMB, the great American astronomer, wrote these
words at the beginning of the present century:
The demonstration that no possible combination of known substances, known
forms of machinery and known forms of force, can be united in a practical machine
by which man shall fly long distances through the air, seems to the writer as com-
plete as it is possible for the demonstration of any physical fact to be. 1
Newcomb was not alone in his scolding of those whose imaginations
allowed them to foresee such things as men flying through the atmos-
phere in heavier than air machines or going to the moon. During
the first few decades of the twentieth century other learned and re-
spected scientists contributed to the derision of anyone suggesting
that such events would eventually come to pass, or that such events
would be of any practical use even if they could be accomplished.2
It is not difficult to imagine what horrors of social and professional
ostracism at the time would probably have befallen a law professor or
practicing attorney who, instead of devoting his time and energies
to such avant-garde subjects as the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, had
decided to devote all or part of his talents to the study of the possible
legal implications of airship operation.'
MR. SLOUP received his J.D. at DePaul University College of Law, is a practicing
member of the Illinois Bar, and is currently engaged in study for his LL.M. in Inter-
national Law at George Washington University.
1. CLARKE, PROFILES OF THE FUTURE 2 (1958).
2. Id. at 3-11.
3. For some interesting early articles on air law see Moore, Aerial Naviga-
tion, 4 LAw NOTES (N.Y.) 87 (1900); Air-ships-a legal problem, 51 SOL. J. 771
(1907); A closed chapter in aeritime law, 19 GREEN BAG 708 (1907); Baldwin,
Law of the Air Ship, 4 AM. J. INT'L L. 95 (1910); Kuhn, The Beginnings of an
Aerial Law, 4 AM. J. INT'L L. 109 (1910).
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The pattern of history linking once absurd ideas with technologi-
cal reality has become all too clear during the present century: the
imaginations of a few individuals conjure up an abstract idea, im-
possible at the time of realization; then comes science and its ever
present though subordinate companion, technology, and through the
human processes of discovery, invention, and innovation the once-
impossible idea becomes everyday reality. Along with and sometimes
before the benefits of the new reality come problems which threaten
in whole or in part the values and very existence of human beings
and their society. The solution of these problems becomes very diffi-
cult because little or no thought was given to them in advance.
Often the laggard in such situations is the law-the tool society em-
ploys for the orderly solution of its problems. The law, often caring
little about the activities of scientists, becomes stifled by the newly
presented accomplishments of engineers and technicians.
The moon, always a subject of great interest to astronomers, now
enjoys a wider scope of attention from men in diverse occupations
and with even more diverse interests. It can be conceived of as a
base from which to either launch missles with thermonuclear war-
heads to Earth or, by intimidation with such missiles, control Earth,
or it can become the scene for international mining and manufac-
turing operations, the output of which will greatly benefit all peoples
on Earth.
That outer space, the newest of man's environments, will become
increasingly important as an arena of human activity and interac-
tion seems at this point, only fourteen years after the launching and
placing into orbit of Earth's first satellite, to be nearly immune
from contradiction. Homo sapiens is basically an exploratory species
and can be expected to advance as far into any newly-found envi-
ronment as he is physically and psychologically able.' The efforts
of humans on Earth to explore and utilize outer space which form-
ally began on October 4, 1957, with the launching of Sputnik I,
will continue to become of greater importance either directly or in-
directly not only to the two giant industrial leaders of the space
club, the United States and the Soviet Union, but to all other nations
on Earth as well. The American space program, although listing
4. Wiley, Space: A Barrier to the Species, NATURAL HISTORY, Jan. 1970, at 70.
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slightly due to the recent near-tragedy of Apollo 13 and the pre-
Apollo 13 decision to reduce NASA's (National Aviation and Space
Administration) budget to the lowest it has been since 1962, will,
nevertheless, remain healthy.' Recently the President outlined six
major areas of concern for the United States space program for the
1970's:
1. The Skylab program, formerly the Apollo Applications Program, which will
involve the launching of manned orbiting space stations into Earth orbit;
2. The development of a space-shuttle system, utilizing either a reusable or a
one-time booster, which will greatly cut the amount of money currently needed to
place a craft into orbit;
3. A second generation Skylab or space station system;
4. Unmanned planetary probes of all or most of the planets in our solar system;
5. Science-applications space flights, involving unmanned satellites, to explore such
fields as communications, meteorology, and earth resources;
6. More lunar landings.6
This will insure that the United States space program will not
atrophy, despite certain necessary budget cuts in view of pressing
domestic needs at home.
The Soviet space program, being veiled in the characteristic se-
crecy of most of the activities of the other leader of the space club,
is a subject open to speculation. It is a certainty, however, that the
efforts of the Soviet Union will at least equal and possibly surpass
those of its rival across the Pacific. The Soviets will no doubt con-
centrate heavily upon the development and installation of a system
of manned space stations in permanent Earth orbit, with manned
lunar landings occupying a subordinate role.7 In addition to this
the Soviet Union, like the United States, will continue to investigate
the military potentials of space as they relate to national security. Of
particular interest are the applications of unmanned satellites to mili-
5. NASA's total budget for fiscal 1972 (as of this writing neither authorized
nor approved) is $3.2 billion, down considerably from the 1965 figure of $5.1
billion. Christian Science Monitor, April 12, 1971, at 9, col. 4.
6. Christian Science Monitor, April 4, 1970, at 5, col. 1. Although there were
seven more lunar landings planned after Apollo 12, the idea of cancelling the last
two missions, Apollos 18 and 19, and using the Saturn 5 components for the second
Skylab series of launchings was advanced before the near-tragedy of Apollo 13 oc-
curred. Christian Science Monitor, April 10, 1970, at 5, col. 4 and Sept. 9, 1970,
at 3, col. 2.
7. Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 27, 1970, at 3, col. 1; June 4, 1970, at 10,
col. 1; and Dec. 23, 1970, at 9, col. 1.
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tary communications and reconnaissance or "spy" functions.8  The
close relation between aerospace technology and national security be-
came all too clear when the first V-1 and V-2 rockets were launched
against London by Nazi Germany in World War II.
The efforts of other countries to explore and utilize the new do-
main of outer space will for some time be closely-allied with either
the United States or the Soviet Union due to the need for a large and
complex industrial base necessary to launch even a small unmanned
satellite into orbit. The United States has extensive space ties with
over seventy countries, and almost two hundred sixty agreements
have been entered into between NASA and other countries for inter-
national space projects.9 Attempts to establish a close working re-
lationship with the Soviet Union, however, have been unsuccessful
for the past ten years. 10
Beyond what are listed above as the main areas of focus for both
the United States and Soviet space efforts in the 1970's it is possible
to envision for the 1980's, and 1990's such developments as: the
ROMBUS (reusable orbital module-booster and utility shuttle, which
is in more common terms an intercontinental ballistic missile which
would be used to carry passengers and freight across the world from
continent to continent in less than one hour); large space stations
with capacities for several hundred individuals; permanent scientific
colonies on the moon and, perhaps later, Mars; manned exploration
of Mars, Venus, Mercury, and perhaps the outer planets; unmanned
interstellar probes; and such future mundane activities as mining and
manufacturing both on the moon and other celestial bodies."
8. The "satellite destroyer" which the Soviet Union has allegedly tested in
Earth orbit (see Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 9, 1970, at 3, col. 2) has a
potential application to the area of national security activities. Such a device could
be used to destroy spy satellites of other states which are spying on the Soviet
Union or its allies. The Soviet Union has in the past taken the position that al-
though a state may not exercise or claim sovereignty over any part of outer space, a
state may legally defend itself against spy activities which take place in outer space.
This could include the destruction of spy satellites. McDOUcAL, LASSWELL &
VLASIC, LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE 311-20 (1964).
9. Christian Science Monitor, April 9, 1970, at 7, col. 1.
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., BONO & GATLAND, FRONTIERS OF SPACE (1969); CLARKE, PROFILES
OF THE FUTURE (1958); CLARKE, THE PROMISE OF SPACE (1968).
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THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE AT PRESENT
Enter the law. Man makes it-breaks it-and endeavors to apply
it, to all of his affairs. Except for periodic spasms of anarchy, war
(governmental anarchy with rules), intrastate riots and other assorted
disruptions, human beings are generally obedient to whatever law
applies to them at the moment. Order is desired in human society;
it is in fact necessary to human society, for no society can exist for
long which permits unrestrained violence among its members.
As Earth people move into outer space, they will bring concepts
of order and, it is hoped, justice with them. To implement order
and justice (the first being a necessary corollary to the second, but
not vice-versa) the law will be used.
Today the law of outer space is pre-embryonic; it is a zygote. It
is the union of an egg and a sperm. The egg is the rapidly appearing
achievements of science and technology, and the sperm is the idea
that rules must be devised to insure that these achievements will not
result in the extinction of man and his home planet as the result of a
massive nuclear holocaust, brought about by man's inability to live
within the technology he has created (the Battle of the Sea of Tran-
quility?).
It was not long after the smoke had cleared from Sputnik's launch-
ing pad and the small metal ball began to beep its way into history
that legal eyes of various types began to focus upon the concept of
law in outer space. Actually, legal articles began to appear in Amer-
ican publications as early as late 1956 and in foreign legal publica-
tions around 1958. Since then the number of articles in legal publica-
tions has increased greatly. Books on space law have also appeared
in greater numbers as space achievements have become more and
more dramatic.' 2
12. Some of the books which have appeared on the subject of space law are
JESSUP & TAUDENFELD, CONTROLS FOR OUTER SPACE (1959); LIPSON & KATZENBACH,
THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE (1961); VAZQUEZ, INTRODUCTION AL DERECHO INTER-
NACIONAL COSMICO (1961); McDOUGAL, LASSWELL & VLASIc, LAW AND PUBLIC
ORDER IN SPACE (1963); HALEY, SPACE LAW AND GOVERNMENT (1963); TAUBEN-
FELD, SPACE AND SOCIETY (1964); JENKS, SPACE LAW (1965); LEVY, SPACE: ITS
IMPACT ON MAN AND SOCIETY (1965); CHRISTOL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
OUTER SPACE (1966); COOPER, EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW (1968); FAW-
CETT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USES OF OUTER SPACE (1968); MCWHINNEY
& BRADLEY, NEW FRONTIERS IN SPACE LAW (1969); MATTE, AEROSPACE LAW
(1969); LAY & TAUBENFELD, THE LAW RELATING TO ACTIVITIES OF MAN IN SPACE
(1970); and WHITE, DECISION-MAKING FOR SPACE (1970).
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The United Nations began to give serious thought to the question
of outer space and its relation to the activities of men and states on
Earth with the passing, on December 13, 1958, of Resolution 1348
(XIII), setting up the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space (COPUOS). The following year COPUOS was estab-
lished to study and review the peaceful uses to which the new domain
could be put and to study any legal problems that might arise from
the exploration of outer space." The next step the United Nations
took was to recommend some basic principles for nations to follow
in their exploration and use of outer space. Resolution 1721(XVI),
passed by unanimous vote of the General Assembly, stated that
(a) International law, including the Charter of the United Nations, applies to
outer space and celestial bodies;
(b) Outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by all States
in conformity with international law and are not subject to national appropriation. 14
Included in this resolution was the provision requesting states launch-
ing objects into orbit or beyond to register the launchings with
COPUOS, through the Secretary General of the United Nations. The
following year another resolution, less important than 1721, was
passed defining the first activities of COPUOS and elaborating prin-
ciples stated in 1721.1" In 1963 another resolution was, like 1721,
passed unanimously.' 6 It was of great importance because it stated
many principles which were later to be used in the 1967 Space
Treaty.'7
Thus, by 1963 there was a growing number of publicists writing
on the subject of outer space, either prescriptively or descriptively as
well as a number of resolutions of the General Assembly setting forth
basic principles to govern the activities and interactions of men and
states in outer space. The writings of publicists are considered a
secondary source of international law.' 8 They are of great impor-
tance in pointing out deficiencies in present legal concepts and rec-
13. G.A. Res. 1472, - U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, at-, U.N. Doe. A/- (1959).
14. G.A. Res. 1721, - U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at-, U.N. Doc. A/- (1961).
15. G.A. Res. 1802, - U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at-, U.N. Doc. A/- (1962).
16. G.A. Res. 1962, - U.N. GAOR Supp. 18, at-, U.N. Doc. A/- (1963).
17. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the moon and Other celestial Bodies, opened
for signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347.
18. I.C.J. STAT. art. 38, para. (l)(d).
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ommending improvements, but they do not actually establish rules
of law. Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, like-
wise, do not establish rules of law. Although it has been stated by
some that certain types of resolutions may have binding force, 9 it
can generally be said that resolutions are only expressions by States
that indicate a consensus of opinion on a particular matter. 20  In this
way they may help to clear the way for later agreements and treaties
21on issues.
The need for some binding statement of the law of outer space,
at least certain basic principles relating to the establishment of mini-
mum public order,22 was apparent, therefore, in the early 1960's.
As the prevention of that third world war, which Einstein said would
precede the war fought with stones, 3 was then and is still the most
important aspect of international law in general, and aerospace law
in particular. Due to the direct relationship between aerospace tech-
nology and the equipping of the world's arsenals, it was appropriate
that one of the first treaties establishing legal norms for man's con-
duct in outer space was the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons
in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water.24  The Treaty
in Article I contains the same proscription as in the title: nuclear
weapons cannot be tested in outer space, as well as in the other spe-
cified parts of man's expanding environment. The Treaty, of
19. See, e.g., Statements of Adlai Stevenson and the representative of the Soviet
Union to the General Assembly regarding the binding force of Resolution 1962
(XVIII) in Simsarian, Outer Space Cooperation in the United Nations in 1963, 58
AM. J. INT'L L. 717, 720-21 (1964); and Bin Cheng, infra note 174.
20. The I.C.J. STAT. art. 38, makes no mention of resolutions as sources of inter-
national law.
21. Vlasic, discussing the inadequacy of Resolutions 1721 and 1962, stated:
"As long as space activities do not include landing manned spacecraft upon celestial
bodies these principles will most likely be adequate. One is, however, less certain as
to their adequacies to prevent controversies once such a landing is made and perma-
nent stations established." VLASic, Law and Public Order In Space: A Balance
Sheet, WORLD PEACE THROUGH LAw-THE WASHINGTON WORLD CONFERENCE 164,
167 (1967).
22. Minimum public order means that the illegal use of coercion and violence
by states is minimized and, eventually, eliminated by proper preventative measures
taken by the world community. See McDOUGAL, LASSWELL & VLASIC supra note 8,
at 102; and VLAsIC, supra note 21, at 170. The use of the term has been criticized,
however; see Cepelka and Gilmore, The Application of General International Law
in Outer Space, 36 J. AIR L. & CoM. 30, 49 n.84 (1970).
23. See quotation in SCOTT, POLITICAL WARFARE 236 (1955).
24. Done Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43.
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course, is binding only upon those States who are parties to it25
(which at this time numbers over one hundred). Notable excep-
tions to the parties to the Treaty are France, the world's number
three space power and a member of increasing importance in the
atomic energy club, and Communist China, the newest space power
and an avid dabbler in the various uses of fission and, before too
long, fusion power. Both France and Communist China have con-
tinued to conduct atmospheric nuclear tests, which are forbidden to
those States who are parties to the Treaty. Underground nuclear
tests, which are not proscribed by the Treaty, have continued to be
performed by certain States, not the least noticeable of which is the
United States.
Another major development in 1963 was the occurrence in Ge-
neva, Switzerland, of the Extraordinary Administrative Radio Con-
ference on Space Communications, 26 attended by some seventy mem-
ber States of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).
The purpose of this conference was to bring some order and regula-
tion to the area of the use of the radio frequency spectrum, a finite
natural resource due to the fact that there is not an unlimited number
of frequencies to be assigned. Allocations of some fifteen per cent
of the entire radio frequency spectrum were made for communica-
tions satellites, space telecommand, telemetry, tracking, meteorologi-
cal and navigational satellites, space research, radio astronomy, and
satellite identification. Also agreed upon were technical standards
and criteria for shared use of certain bands between space activities
and terrestial communications. The registry of assigned frequencies
and the recording of harmful interferences are kept by the Interna-
tional Frequency Registration Board, which is an organ of the ITU.
The Board, however, has no power to enforce the regulations in case
of a violation. Another limitation of the Conference is that member
states reserve the right to limit their adherences to the allocations in
order to protect their "national interests.
27
In the year following the Conference another major step was taken
25. But see VLASIC, supra note 21, at 172.
26. Done Nov. 8, 1963, 15 U.S.T. 887, T.I.A.S. No. 5603. The 1963 Confer-
ence was a partial revision of the Radio Regulations, Geneva, signed on Dec. 21,
1959, 12 U.S.T. 2377, T.I.A.S. No. 4893.
27. VLASIC, supra note 21, at 174.
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in the area of telecommunications-the area of space law which has
so far been regulated most. The International Telecommunications
Satellite Consortium (INTELSAT), which was in the works for
several years previous to 1964 and to which over seventy States are
currently parties, established interim arrangements for the first global
commercial satellite system.2 1 Also signed in 1964 along with the
main INTELSAT agreement was a Special Agreement, 29 the for-
mer setting up the framework and policy of INTELSAT, the latter
being more directed to the management and functioning of the or-
ganization. Since the launching of its first satellite, Early Bird, in
April 1965, INTELSAT has launched three series of satellites into
positions in orbit around Earth. At the present the satellites which
are used to relay television broadcasts from one country to another
require ground stations to receive the broadcasts, but plans have been
made for the launching in either 1972 or 1973 of the INTELSAT
IV series, which will consist of satellites able to receive television
broadcasts from one country and transmit them directly to individual
television sets in other countries without the need of intervening
ground receiving stations. This system will first be tested by the
United States for educational purposes in India. 0
28. An agreement establishing interim arrangements for a global commercial
communications satellite system [hereinafter INTELSAT Agreement], done Aug. 20,
1964, 15 U.S.T. 1705, T.I.A.S. No. 5646, 514 U.N.T.S. 26. The agreement expired
in 1970, but as of this writing there has been no final decision on a new agreement.
Negotiations are currently underway in Washington, however. See Ablard, The
International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium Conference-Where Do We
Go From Here? 12 AFJAG L. REv. 231 (1970). The Soviet Union and its
satellite states are not members on INTELSAT, but they have submitted to the
United Nations tentative plans for their own such system. See Doyle, Analysis of
the Socialist States' Proposal for Intersputnik: An International Communication
Satellite System, 15 VILL. L. REV. 83 (1969).
29. Special Agreement, done Aug. 20, 1964, 15 U.S.T. 1745, T.I.A.S. No. 5646,
514 U.N.T.S. 48. On June 4, 1965, the INTELSAT Supplementary Agreement on
Arbitration was opened for signature, the text to which can be found at 4 INTIL
LEGAL MATERIALS 735 (1965). The Arbitration Agreement is discussed here in de-
tail in infra text accompanying note 199.
30. The text of the agreement between India and the United States concerning
this project can be found at 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1281 (1969). Another
INTELSAT project involves the linking up by June 1971 of Pakistan with the glo-
bal network of communication satellites, and of East and West Pakistan, currently
separated by more than 1,000 miles of Indian territory, with each other. To accom-
plish this, an INTELSAT Series 3 Communication Satellite will be placed in syn-
chronous orbit over the Indian Ocean, and two earth ground stations will be
built, one in East and one in West Pakistan respectively. Christian Science Moni-
tor, Jan. 31, 1970, at 11, col. 1.
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The business manager of INTELSAT is, by agreement of the
member States, the Communications Satellite Corporation (COM-
SAT), created by the 1962 Communications Satellite Act 2 to
establish together and in cooperation with other States a global
communications satellite system. 8  COMSAT is also, of course, the
United States representative to INTELSAT.
The developments discussed above all relate to two important and
distinct areas of the law of outer space-minimum public order and
telecommunications. Until 1967 there was no agreement or treaty
entered into on a world-wide basis designed to state legal principles
of a more general nature applicable to outer space. Then in that
year the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies 4 (1967 Space Treaty) was opened for signa-
ture in Washington, London, and Moscow. 5 Contrary to the opinions
of some, this treaty is not by any means a cosmic Code of Hammurabi.
It is simply a multilateral treaty, binding only on those states who are
parties to it, which attempts to establish certain basic principles for
the conduct of human activities in the new realm of outer space,
rather than attempting to formulate precise substantive and proce-
dural rules of law. The 1967 Space Treaty is the product of com-
promise and is in some areas vague and indefinite.
Among the most important sections of the treaty are Articles II
and IV. Article II states that "outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by
claim of sovereignty by means of use or occupation, or by any other
means." The rule, however, that no State may claim any part of
outer space or any natural celestial body as part of its own territory
was generally regarded as an accepted legal principle by writers and
statesmen for some time before this treaty.86 This Article, however,
does not solve the problem of the appropriation of natural resources
31. INTELSAT Agreement, art. VIII, done Aug. 20, 1964, 15 U.S.T. 1705,
T.I.A.S. No. 5646.
32. 76 Stat. 419, 47 U.S.C. 701 et seq. Aug. 31, 1962.
33. See 47 U.S.C. 701(a).
34. Done Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347.
35. The 1967 Space Treaty was opened for signature in the three capitals in
order to insure that a maximum number of states would sign the treaty.
36. See sources cited inf ra note 175 and accompanying text.
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found in outer space or on celestial bodies, which is one of the main
problems for the near future in space law. 7 The analogous Earth
situation is obvious: the high seas, like outer space, is not subject
to claim of sovereignty or ownership itself, but fish, minerals, and
other resources may be taken from the high seas and claimed as the
property of the takers.
Article IV of the treaty states: "Parties to the Treaty undertake
not to place into orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear
weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install
such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer
space in any other manner." This is a most significant provision as
it forbids devices of destruction and devastation from Earth orbit,
celestial bodies, and other parts of outer space. Unfortunately
ICBM's, IRBM's, SLBM's, ABM's, FOBS's (the Soviet fractional or-
bital bombardment system), and MIRV's, (the United States mul-
tiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle) do not go into orbit
around the Earth when used as intended. They are all sub-orbital
weapons and are excluded from the Article IV proscription.
Other important parts of the 1967 Space Treaty state that, 1)
States shall conduct activities in outer space in accordance with inter-
national law (Articles I and I1); 2) there shall be free access to
outer space for all states on a basis of equality (Article I); 3) astro-
nauts shall be given all possible assistance in case of accident, dis-
tress, or emergency (Article V); 4) States shall bear international
responsibility for governmental and non-governmental activities car-
ried on under their supervision and shall also be responsible for the
activities of international organizations of which they are a part (Ar-
ticle VI); 5) States shall be responsible for damage or injury caused
by the launching or attempted launching into outer space of objects
(Article VII); 6) States shall retain jurisdiction over objects and
personnel they launch into outer space (Article VIII); and 7) states
shall act in accordance with certain specified principles of coopera-
tion, mutual assistance, due care, diligence, and non-interference in
their exploration and use of outer space (Articles IX, X, XI, XII).
As already mentioned, the Treaty is not by any means the last
37. For a discussion for possible problems relating to Article II of the 1967
Space Treaty see Gorove, Interpreting Article 11 of the Outer Space Treaty, 37
FoRDHAM L. Rnv. 349 (1969).
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word on space law. It is only an attempt at a beginning, a beginning
which will by necessity see many elaborations, modifications, and
even complete changes in the principles set forth in it as man comes
closer to a rough approximation of his relationship to the universe as
a whole.
Meanwhile, further elaboration has already been accomplished re-
garding certain parts of the 1967 Space Treaty. In 1968 the Agree-
ment on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space s (1968 Astronaut
Agreement) was concluded, elaborating upon Articles V (astronaut
rescue) and VIII (retention of jurisdiction over objects and personnel)
of the 1967 Space Treaty. Although definitely an improvement in
the definition of the legal rights and duties of states in regard to the
above areas, the 1968 Astronaut Agreement does not entirely clear
up the area, leaving perhaps the necessity of more thoughtful develop-
ment.89 Nevertheless, it is a step in the right direction.
Another important treaty concluded in 1968 was the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,4 ° designed to halt the
spread of nuclear weapons by preventing nuclear powers from giving
such weapons to non-nuclear states, and by preventing non-nuclear
states from developing their own nuclear weapons, either by them-
selves or with assistance from nuclear states. Notably absent from
the list of signatory states, are of course, France and Communist
China. Although outer space is not expressly mentioned in the
treaty, the extent of the Treaty into this area is indicated by its refer-
ence to the 1963 Test-Ban Treaty.
In addition to the above-mentioned treaties, the United States has
entered into a large number of agreements, mostly bilateral, with
other states concerning technical matters, such as tracking stations
38. Done April 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, T.I.A.S. No. 6599.
39. See generally Gorove, Legal Problems of the Rescue and Return of As-
tronauts 3 INT'L LAWYER 898 (1969); and Riccio, Another Step for Mankind-The
Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into
Outer Space, 12 AFJAG L. REv. 142 (1970). The Soviet Union agreed recently to
join the United States and ten other nations in discussing an international space
rescue system. Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 10, 1970, at 2, col. 1. See also
editorial "Cooperation In Space Rescues," Id. at 14, col. 1.
40. Opened for signature on July 1, 1968, [1968] - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. -.
The text of the treaty treaty can be found at 7 INT'L LEGAL MATERuAs 811 (1968).
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and scientific projects. 4' The Soviet Union has also entered into a
number of such agreements. Even more important to the future
course of Earth-space activities, however, are those treaties creating
regional intergovernmental organizations for the purpose of explor-
ing and utilizing outer space. Two such treaties, both signed in
1962, were the Convention for the Development and Construction of
Space Vehicle Launchers,42 which created the European Launcher
and Development Organization (ELDO), and the Convention for the
Establishment of a European Space Research Organization
(ESRO).48  ELDO, a politically and economically-oriented organi-
zation, was composed of West Germany, the United Kingdom,
France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Australia. The mem-
ber states of ELDO have decided to dissolve the organization, pre-
sumably to lay the groundwork for the creation of a new and more
improved organization.44 ESRO, a scientifically-oriented organiza-
tion composed of West Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy,
Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Spain, and Den-
mark, approaches the end of its initial eight year authorization this
year. France and Denmark have served notice of intent to withdraw
from the organization, apparently to force the other states in ESRO
to thoroughly rethink the whole cooperative effort.45 This is the for-
mal procedure of protest, provided for in the ESRO charter, and
may eventually lead to a new and improved European space organi-
zation, with the areas of rocket development (which was ELDO's
function) and research applications being integrated. 4
CLASSIFICATION OF DISPUTES WHICH WILL ARISE IN OUTER SPACE
The Earth law now applicable to outer space, insofar as human
beings are concerned, is, as stated earlier, in a pre-embryonic stage.
It must and will develop as the activities of man in outer space be-
come more complex, more significant to everyday life, and more ex-
tended throughout our solar system and, eventually, beyond. More
41. Christian Science Monitor, supra note 9.
42. Done on March 29, 1962, 507 U.N.T.S. 177 et seq.
43. Signed on June 14, 1962, 528 U.N.T.S. 33 et seq.
44. See Christian Science Monitor, February 13, 1971, at 11, col. 3.
45. Id.
46. Id.
630 [Vol. XX: 618
1971] OUTER SPACE CONFLICTS
treaties, especially multilateral treaties, will be needed to define, with
clarity and precision, the rights and duties of those who participate in
outer space activities i.e., liability for personal injury and property
damage, appropriation and use of natural resources found in outer
space and on celestial bodies, jurisdiction over crimes-torts, use of
national airspace for purposes of innocent passage by space shuttle-
craft returning from outer space, and many other problem areas not
even capable of being defined at this time. International coopera-
tion, which now ranges from passive non-interference to accommo-
dation to active bilateral and multilateral participation in joint ef-
forts,47 must increase so that man's skills and resources are not
wasted on a duplication of efforts and needless dispute.
Nevertheless, there will be conflicts of interest. The individuals
who have gone into space thus far, have been skilled test pilots, gen-
erally with military backgrounds. The craft they have piloted have
been of the nationalities of their single states. Their missions have
been basically of experimentation and exploration.4 8 Although these
47. Passive non-interference refers to the efforts of states to stay away from, or
at least not interfere with, the spacecraft recovery operations and various missile
tests conducted on the high seas by other states. In doing so, states have at least
impliedly said that although the high seas are free for use by all states and are
not subject to the exclusive use and possession by any one state or group of states,
a state or group of states acting jointly in recovery or test operations may be al-
lowed or accorded a limited license by other states to use exclusively and tem-
porarily, a part of the high seas for such operations, as long as the operations are
not in some way violative of international law (as a nuclear test over the high seas
would be if conducted by a state party to the 1963 Test Ban Treaty).
Accommodation includes such activities as the giving by one state to another
state of information vital to the safe conduct of the latter state's space activities.
An example of this occurred during the mission of Apollo 11 when U.S. Astronaut
Frank Borman requested and received from the Soviet Union the coordinates of the
lunar orbit of Luna 15, which was feared by some United States space officials as
posing a threat to the Apollo 11 mission. Principles of non-interference and ac-
comodation have similarly been included in the 1967 Space Treaty, Articles IX, X,
XI, XII.
The highest level of international cooperation in outer space, of course, is active
bilateral and multilateral participation in joint efforts, as illustrated by the many
treaties and other international agreements in existence dealing with some aspect of
the exploration and use of outer space. See Robinson, NASA's Bilateral and Multi-
lateral Agreements-A Comprehensive Program for International Cooperation in
Space Research, 36 J. AIR L. & COM. 729 (1970).
48. It must be realized that most space missions, whether manned or unmanned,
have some degree of political importance. Thus, Explorer 1, while making scientific
history by discovering the Van Allen Radiation Belt around Earth, had great political
importance due to the fact that it was America's first successfully-launched un-
manned satellite. While manned flights have been concerned mainly with experi-
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circumstances will continue, they will not in the future be dominant,
for there will go into outer space a progression of individuals of in-
creasingly diverse backgrounds and occupations. There will be
spacecraft launched by international organizations, either of world-
wide scope, such as INTELSAT, or regional scope, such as ELDO
and ESRO. These spacecraft will be both manned and unmanned,
and their missions will be not only of an exploratory nature, but com-
mercial as well. One does not need the foresight and imagination of
a da Vinci or a Verne to realize that, despite an expanding body of
law applicable to outer space, there will be conflicting claims and
differences of opinion as to matters of common interest and concern.
For purposes of clarification and orientation the following classifica-
tion of potential areas of space and space-related disputes can be
made at the present time:
By Subject Matter
1. Liability for personal injury and property damage caused by space activities;
2. Appropriation and use of natural resources found in outer space and on natural
celestial bodies;
3. Appropriation and use of outer space qua space (i.e., the use of the surfaces of
natural celestial bodies and parts of outer space itself for laboratories, factories,
etc. Analogous situations on Earth include floating canneries, whaling factory ships,
and oil-drilling facilities located on the high seas.);
4. Problems related to the legal dichotomy between national airspace and outer
space:
a) Whether there should be established a definite point at which national air-
space (subject to the sovereignty of the subjacent state) ends, and outer space
(free for use by all states and not subject to any sovereign claims) begins;
b) The location of such of such a point if there should be one;
c) The alternative to such a point if there should not be one;
d) Whether the concept of innocent passage should be adopted by multilateral
treaty for space shuttlecraft which may, by necessity, need to pass through
foreign national airspace;
5. Jurisdictional conflicts between states which claim jurisdiction over an in-
dividual, unincorporated association, or corporation for acts, such as crimes and
torts, detrimental to the states involved;
6. Problems related to the maintenance of peace and security in outer space;
7. Pollution, interference with telecommunications, invasions of privacy, and other
such problems brought about by rapidly advancing science and technology which
are caused very often by governmental as opposed to individual activities;
8. Problems not even capable of being defined at this time.
mentation and exploration, unmanned spacecraft have conducted many activities re-
lated to national security (spying) and commercial enterprise (communications and
meteorology).
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By Parties
1. States;
2. International organizations, whether or not connected with the United Nations;
3. Corporations and unincorporated associations;
4. Individuals;
5. And possibly, to make this list all-inclusive, forms of extra-terrestrial sentient
life which come into contact with humans from Earth.
It is the thesis of this discussion that some means of resolving
these disputes must be available to the parties involved when other
peaceful methods of resolution fail, i.e., either the International Court
of Justice or some other world tribunal. The need for the prevention
of a Hobbesian-type anarchy, such as the American "Old West" or
the seventeenth and eighteenth century Caribbean, in outer space
was well-recognized by McDougal and Associates:
We see no advantage in allowing frontier conditions of initial disorder to establish a
tradition of lawlessness in the world of space. It is much too dangerous. We
conclude that from the beginning ample provision needs to be made for public
officials to take responsibility for invoking norms of public order in connection
with exploration and settlement.49
SOVEREIGNTY, SPACE POLICE, AND COURT DECISIONS
Before proceeding to a discussion of the general rule of municipal
court jurisdiction over cases having some international aspect, such as
a foreign national within the jurisdiction of the municipal court or
an act committed by a national beyond the territorial boundaries of
his home state, and of the exceptions to the general rule, namely,
those situations in which international tribunals (and most particu-
larly the International Court of Justice) have jurisdiction over such
cases, it will be necessary to briefly discuss the limited nature of inter-
national courts. It is a well-established principle, of course, that each
of the Nation-States (hereinafter referred to as States) is a sovereign
entity under international law. It is because of this principle that
the decisions of an international court, as will be seen in more detail
later with respect to the International Court of Justice, are binding
only upon those States which have submitted the dispute in which
they are involved to the court. 50 The International Court of Justice,
created by the Charter of the United Nations, a multilateral treaty, is
49. McDOUGAL, LASSWELL & VLASIC, supra note 8, at 1066-67.
50. I.C.J. STAT. art. 59.
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a legally created institution under international law. When it gives
a decision on a particular case before it that decision is binding upon
those states (or certain international organizations as will be seen
later) which have submitted the dispute to it, as long as the court
had jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of the case. In
this respect the decisions of the court are similar to the decisions of
a municipal court. Enforcement of the court's decisions, however,
is not available as it is with municipal court decisions because of the
fact that there does not exist on the international level any executive
or administrative agency analogous to a local police force, national
police force, or military force, as there is on the municipal level.
Although it is possible to employ various persuasive means to enforce
the decisions of the International Court of Justice, such as embargo,
public opinion, or threat of non-reciprocity, the fact remains that
there is no international police force available to enforce the decisions
of the court upon those states which agreed to be bound by them.
Nevertheless, the decisions remain legally valid and binding. Fur-
thermore, the concept of a world police force, or more particularly
for the purposes of this discussion, an international space police force,
is not possible within the framework of the existing international
reality of the planet Earth. Hans Kelsen sums it up well:
An international police force would be a radical restriction, if not the total de-
struction, of the sovereignty of the States. Such a police force is the essential ele-
ment of a World State, and the idea of a World State is, at least for the present
generation, a utopian scheme. 51
Kelsen was writing during the middle of a "hot" war, but his state-
ment seems equally valid for the current "cold" war. Although there
may be minute indications that the cold war is beginning to thaw,52
it is safe to assert at this point that a world police force, operating
with the blessings and assistance of all of the states of the world (and
perhaps with an outer space branch), is still far beyond the horizon
of existing international relations. Also, a world police force would
probably have to be under the control of a world executive body,
perhaps under some scheme of world federalism. Kelsen's words are
equally appropriate in regard to this:
51. Kelsen, Compulsory Adjudication of International Disputes, 37 AM. J. INTIL
L. 397, 399 (1943).
52. Christian Science Monitor, March 1, 1971, at 1, col. 2.
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The organization of a centralized executive power, the most difficult of all the
problems of world organization, cannot be the first, it can only be one of the last
steps; a step which in any case cannot successfully be undertaken before the
international court has been established, and has, by its impartial activities, gained
the confidence of the governments.5 3
Kelsen was writing after the Permanent Court of International Justice
had become inactive in 1939 and before the present International
Court of Justice was established in 1945. If "natural legal evolution
tends first toward an international judiciary, and not toward interna-
tional government or legislation," 4 then to focus attention upon the
potential role of the International Court of Justice as an arbitrator
and adjudicator of international disputes in outer space as well as on
Earth would be a logical step toward the establishment of minimum
public order-problem one in both international and aerospace law,
the latter being a subdivision of the former. This is not to say, how-
ever, that concepts such as an international space police force and
legislative and executive bodies will never become workable. Quite
to the contrary, such bodies will indeed eventually have to achieve
the status of institutionalized reality if the planet Earth is to achieve
some type of permanent order so that justice and peace can be se-
cured for its inhabitants. The object of this paper is to provide for
some type of interim measures to achieve the above goals for the
time period between the present reality and the more idealistic scheme
mentioned above.
THE PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND MUNICIPAL
COURT JURISDICTION
Since the submission of disputes by states to international courts,
and particularly to the International Court of Justice, for either ad-
visory or adjudicatory proceedings is the exception and not the rule
in international law today; and since it is also a recognized principle
that in criminal and other important matters municipal court juris-
diction applies in the absence of an express principle of international
law, 5 it is essential that an examination of the general nature of the
jurisdiction of municipal courts in regard to criminal and other im-
portant matters be conducted at this point.
53. Supra note 51, at 399.
54. Supra note 51, at 400.
55. See Case of the S.S. "Lotus," [19271 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9.
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Although the concept of territory, as will later become evident,
is decreasing in importance as a basis for jurisdiction in international
law today, it is still helpful to structure an inquiry into the nature of
municipal court jurisdiction in terms of cases arising both within and
without a state's territorial boundaries.
The question of when states can assert jurisdiction within their
territorial boundaries is basically an easy one. The general rule is
that each nation-state, being a sovereign entity under international
law, has exclusive jurisdiction within its territorial boundaries over all
persons, whether nationals or foreigners, and all things, whether tan-
gible or intangible."" The word exclusive, however, does not mean
absolute, as states themselves impose certain limitations, often upon
a basis of reciprocity, upon their jurisdiction within their territorial
boundaries.
One of these limitations is the so-called "act of state" doctrine,
which forbids the courts of one State from questioning the legal
validity of the acts of the government of another State done within
the latter State's territory. The doctrine has been applied both in
cases where the foreign government's act of State has allegedly vio-
lated its own municipal law,57 or where it has allegedly violated in-
ternational law,"8 although exceptions have been made to the latter
application of the doctrine.5"
56. I OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 325 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955) [herein-
after cited as OPPENHEIM]; BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 222, 299 (6th ed. 1963).
57. "It should make no difference whether the foreign act (of state) is, under
(the foreign state's) local law, partially or wholly, technically or fundamentally,
illegal. . . . So long as the act is the act of the foreign sovereign, it matters not
how grossly the sovereign has transgressed its own laws." Banco de Espana v.
Federal Reserve Bank of New York 114 F.2d 438, 444 (2nd Cir. 1940).
58. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), where
the Court held that it would not examine the validity of the taking of property
within United States territory by an expropriation decree of the Cuban government
in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling
legal principles of the case, even if the Cuban decree allegedly violated customary
international law. id. at 428.
59. The effect of the Sabbatino decision was lessened, if not eliminated com-
pletely, by the Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964,
22 U.S.C. 2370(e)(2), as amended, 79 Stat. 658-659 (Sept. 6, 1965), the consti-
tutionality of which has been upheld. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F.
Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), af'd 383 F.2d 166 (2nd Cir. 1967), cert. denied 390
U.S. 956 (1968). In the amendment Congress had declared that courts of the United
States should not refrain, on the basis of the act of state doctrine, from determining
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Another limitation is the doctrine of sovereign immunity. It is,
of course, a well-known fact that a State may not be sued in the
courts of another State unless the former has consented to be sued.60
Certain persons and objects are also granted immunity from the juris-
diction of foreign states in whose territorial boundaries they happen
to be. Often such persons and objects are said to have acquired the
status of "extra-territoriality," although this term is a fiction since the
person or object is in fact physically within the foreign State. The use
of the "extra-territoriality" concept has drawn criticism from both
publicists and courts.61 A preferable way to explain such exceptions
to State internal jurisdiction is to say that the person or object has
acquired some degree of sovereign immunity from the jurisdiction of
the foreign state. In some instances the act of State doctrine will
apply along with the sovereign immunity concept.
In regard to persons the most obvious type of immunity is that
which a sovereign or head of State has when visiting a foreign State.
A monarch or other head of State has complete immunity from all
prosecution, both civil and criminal, in such an instance.6 2  Diplo-
matic and consular agents are accorded a varying range of immunities
while in foreign countries depending upon their rank,68 although con-
sular personnel have less immunity, usually, than do diplomatic per-
sonnel. For non-official acts consular agents are usually subject to
the jurisdiction of the foreign state. Military personnel of one State
in the territory of another State have never enjoyed the traditional im-
munity which diplomatic officials have enjoyed, although there have
been views to the effect that they should be immune from local juris-
diction. 4  The general rule is that they are at least subject to local
criminal jurisdiction.65 Usually, the problem of military personnel
the merits in cases involving a confiscation after January 1, 1959 by an act of a
foreign state in violation of the principles of international law, including the prin-
ciples of compensation.
60. BRIERLY, supra note 56, at 243.
61. BRIERLY, supra note 56, at 222.
62. OPPENHEIM, supra note 56, at 759, 763. See also the classic case of Mighell
v. Sultan of Jahore [1894] 1 Q.B. 149.
63. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 56, at 783-813 (for diplomatic agents) and at
840-43 (for consular agents).
64. OPPENHEIM, supra note 56, at 847.
65. OPPENHEIM, supra note 56, at 848-49. See also the account of the McLeod
case (25 Wend. 483) in OPPENHEIM, supra note 56, at 850.
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being in a foreign country with the consent of the foreign govern-
ment is handled by special agreements called "status of forces" agree-
ments. In special cases, even immunity acquired in such a manner
may be waived, as it was in the widely publicized case of Wilson v.
Girard.
Agents and personnel of international organizations, such as the
United Nations, have also been accorded immunity by special agree-
ment. Article 105 of the United Nations Charter states that "Repre-
sentatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the
Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as
are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in con-
nection with the Organization." Also the United Nations itself shall
have such privileges and immunities in the territory of each of the
member States "as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes. '6 7
Members of the International Court of Justice are granted diplomatic
privileges and immunities when engaged in the business of the court, "
and the agents, counsel, and advocates of parties before the court
are also granted the same when "necessary to the independent exer-
cise of their duties." 69
Governmental property, consensually within the territory of a for-
eign state, has traditionally been held to be beyond the jurisdiction
of the foreign state. Perhaps the most famous case illustrating this
point is The Schooner Exchange v. MacFaddon,70 where immunity
was granted to a French naval vessel in the port of Philadelphia on a
friendly visit. The vessel originally had been seized by the forces of
Napoleon, Emperor of France, while it was sailing toward the port
of San Sebastian in Spain during a blockade of England by French
naval forces, and it was subsequently transformed into a French naval
vessel. The former American owners tried to regain ownership of
the vessel while it was in American waters, but since it had become
a governmental vessel of France, their suit was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
66. 354 U.S. 524 (1957).
67. U.N. CHARTER art. 105, para. 1.
68. I.C.J. STAT. art. 19. See also art. 32, para. 8 for tax exemption for court
members.
69. I.C.J. STAT. art. 42, para. 3.
70. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
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Property of a foreign state on dry land is subject, generally, to the
same immunity. In Vavasseur v. Krupp7 an action was brought
by one Josiab Vavasseur against Friedrich Krupp, the famous arma-
ment manufacturer, and his agent in England for an injunction
against the shipping of a quantity of shells and other projectiles out
of England. The armaments were at that time the property of the
government of Japan and were bound for Japan. Plaintiff claimed
damages for patent infringement by Krupp. The English court de-
nied the injunction on the basis that it could not deprive a foreign
sovereign of his public property or deny him the right to remove his
property from British jurisdiction. Lord Justice Cotton stated the
law in regard to property owned by a foreign sovereign:
This court has no jurisdiction, and in my opinion none of the courts in this country
have any jurisdiction, to interfere with the property of a foreign sovereign, more es-
pecially what we call the public property of the state of which he is sovereign, as
distinguished from that which may be his own private property. The courts
have no jurisdiction to do so, not only because there is no jurisdiction as against the
individual, but because there is no jurisdiction as against the foreign country who
has property there, although that foreign country is represented, as all foreign coun-
tries having a sovereign are represented, by the individual who is the sovereign. 7 2
Although the immunity of warships under the Exchange principle
has never been seriously questioned, a problem did arise with respect
to vessels, owned and operated by foreign governments and therefore
ostensibly under the doctrine of absolute immunity, which were in-
volved in commercial activities within the territorial boundaries of
other States. The concept of absolute immunity was applied to an
Italian vessel, owned and operated by the Italian government and
docked in New York harbor on a commercial visit, in Berizzi Bros.
Co. v. S.S. Pesaro.73 Later cases, however, have denied absolute
immunity to ships of foreign governments engaged in commercial
ventures. Thus, in Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman,74 a vessel owned
by Mexico but in the "possession, operation, and control"of a private
Mexican corporation was denied immunity from suit by the owner of
an American vessel which had been damaged by the Mexican vessel
in an accident in Mexican waters.75
71. 9 Ch. Div. 351 (1878).
72. Id. at 360.
73. 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
74. 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
75. id. at 32, 33. An earlier case, also involving a Mexican vessel, was The
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Corporations, whether wholly or partly owned by a foreign state,
have generally been denied immunity unless the corporation and the
government were so close as to be viewed as an entity. The general
test in such cases is whether the corporation is either an arm of the
government were so close as to be viewed as one entity. The general
for private gain or for the gain of the State. Thus, a bank created
by the law of the State of Argentina was denied immunity from the
jurisdiction of New York courts because, although the bank was an
instrumentality of the State of Argentina, the activities of the bank
upon which the suit was based were of a private nature.76 Where
there is little difference or no difference at all between the corporate
body and the governmental body it serves, both American and Eng-
lish courts have ruled that immunity will be granted to the corpora-
tion or business entity under the sovereign immunity doctrine.77
Of greater importance to the establishment of at least minimum
public order both on Earth and in outer space than the question of
when a State can or cannot assert jurisdiction over persons or objects
within its territory is the question of when a State may assert jurisdic-
tion over persons and objects located outside of its territory, either
in a foreign State or in an area not subject to claims of sovereignty by
any State, such as on the high seas or in outer space. With regard to
those situations where a state will desire to assert jurisdiction beyond
its territorial boundaries due to the impact of the event upon the
Uxmal, 40 F. Supp. 258 (D. Mass. 1941). The Court ruled that in order for a
foreign merchant vessel to acquire sovereign immunity it must not only be owned by
the foreign government, but it also must be possessed and operated by the govern-
ment for some national purpose.
76. Mirabella v. Banco Industrial de la Repsblica Argentina, 237 N.Y.S.2d 499
(1963).
77. See, e.g., Mason v. Intercolonial Railway of Canada, 83 N.E. 876 (Mass.
1908), in which a suit brought against a Canadian railway was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction because the court found that the railway was the property of the King of
England, not a corporation, and operated through the government of Canada for the
public purposes of Canada; Dunlap v. Banco Central del Ecuador, 41 N.Y.S.2d 650
(1943), where the court said that the question of whether an Ecuadorian corpora-
tion was entitled to sovereign immunity depended in turn upon how closely it was
related to the Ecuadorian government and whether the acts were public or private
acts; and an English case, Baccus S.R.I. v. Servicio Nacional del Trigo, [19571 1.
Q.B. 438, involving an Italian corporation suing a Spanish corporation which was
carrying on business in Spain. Both parties had agreed contractually to submit the
dispute to the London courts. It was held that the Spanish corporation, being a
department of the state of Spain, was entitled to sovereign immunity even though
it was a corporate body and a separate legal entity.
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State's important interests, the following dichotomy can be made:
1.) events which either are not disruptive or cannot reasonably be
expected to be disruptive of peaceful relations between states; and
2.) events which either are disruptive or can within reason be ex-
pected to be disruptive of peaceful relations between states.
In order to classify an activity or interaction under the above
scheme, whether the activity involves individuals, groups of individ-
uals in either corporate or non-corporate associations, States them-
selves, or regional or worldwide international organizations, it is
necessary to look at the effects of the activity upon the goals and
values of the states which desire to assert jurisdiction over the event.
Among the most important values or goals any State has are those
regarding its defense and national security, economic stability, wel-
fare of its nationals and their property, and prestige. Any event oc-
curring outside of the territory of a State which threatens or acts in
derogation of any of the above interests will be cause for the State
to find some means of asserting jurisdiction over the event and
thereby having the matter handled by its municipal courts. Disputes
arising from interactions such as contracts, marriages, births, deaths
by natural causes, divorces, will contests, inter vivos gifts and the
like are not, as a general rule, a substantial threat to the above-men-
tioned interests of States. While States are interested in the protec-
tion of the interests of their nationals in regard to these events, there
is not much danger that two or more states will go to war or even
resort to less hostile methods such as blockade in the event of a con-
flict over who shall resolve the matter in whose municipal courts.
While the conflict of laws rules regarding such matters are far from
settled, there is no need to worry that disputes based upon such mat-
ters will be disruptive of world peace or the establishment of a more
stable international situation. It is for this reason that these events
and the jurisdictional problems they present will not be discussed in
the remainder of this paper.
Events which belong to the second classification and which are,
therefore, of much greater interest to any State include crimes and
torts which, although committed outside the borders of a State, may
threaten any one of its important interests, acts committed by other
States which, although not traditionally classifiable as either crimes
or torts, due to the fact that they were committed by other States,
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affect various interests of many States, and treaty disputes. While
some of these events are subject to the jurisdiction of municipal
courts, as will be seen, others, such as treaty disputes, can only be
handled by an international court.
Crimes committed outside of the territorial boundaries of a State
which affect that State in some way will almost always cause that
State to seek some means of legally asserting jurisdiction over the in-
dividuals involved. Of special interest, of course, are crimes which
affect a State's security, such as treason, and economic stability, such
as counterfeiting and fraud.
The basic rule for international criminal jurisdiction is that no
State will apply the criminal laws and sanctions of another State.7 s
Punishment for criminal acts has never been considered by either common or civil
law as "transitory" or "extra-territorial." Each state punishes only acts criminal by
its own law; there is never any choice of law problem as such-though it is entirely
possible for the same acts to constitute a crime by the law of more than a single
state.
7 9
When the offence is committed by either a national or an alien out-
side of the territorial boundaries of a State, but which violates the law
of that State, a number of theories or principles exist which the State
may use in order to legally assert jurisdiction over the suspect. Inter-
national law shows no uniformity in practice.
The territorial principle, followed by the United States, Great Brit-
ain, and a number of other States, holds that a State may not exercise
jurisdiction over either a national or an alien for a criminal act com-
mitted outside of the State's territorial boundaries. This principle,
when applied to crimes committed by nationals, is illustrated by the
classic case of the American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,80 in
which the United States Supreme Court refused to enforce the pro-
visions of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act against the United Fruit Com-
78. OPPENHEIM, supra note 56, at 328.
79. Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and Toler-
ances in Interstate and International Law, 65 YALE L.J. 1087, 1140 (footnote
omitted) (1956). On jurisdiction in general see also George, Extraterritorial Ap-
plication of Penal Legislation, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 609 (1966); Sarkar, The Proper
Law oj Crime in International Law, 11 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 446 (1962); Tauben-
feld, States and Offenses Committed Beyond Their Border, 16 N.Y.L. FOR. 592
(1970); Falk, International Jurisdiction: Horizontal and Vertical Conceptions of
Legal Order, 32 TEMP. L. Q. 295 (1959).
80. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
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pany for activities undertaken by the latter in Panama and Costa
Rica, where the alleged acts were not in violation of local law. Since
that case was decided, however, exceptions to the territorial principle
have evolved, allowing United States courts to assert jurisdiction over
nationals of the United States who have committed offenses, defined
as such under the law of the United States, outside of the United
States. These cases for all practical purposes overrule the holding
in American Banana and usually involve crimes harmful to the eco-
nomic"' or national security8 2 interests of the United States. In these
cases the United States nationals were arrested and tried whether
they returned voluntarily or involuntarily to the United States.
Other United States cases have also shown that the territorial prin-
ciple of jurisdiction as applied to United States nationals has been
greatly weakened. 3 The most important fact to recognize about
the territorial principle is not that it allows a State to exercise juris-
81. See, e.g., United States v. Sisal Sales Corporation, 274 U.S. 268 (1927), in
which defendant American corporations were enjoined by a federal court from
conducting in Yucatan various activities designed to control the exportation of sisal
from Mexico to the United States and monopolize the market both inside and out-
side the United States in violation of provisions of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act;
and Steel v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952), in which a federal district
court in Texas was held to have jurisdiction over a suit by an American watch
company to enjoin a United States citizen from using the company's trade mark,
registered under United States law, in Mexico on watches made in Mexico. The
Court, quoting from Skirotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73 (1941), stated the
principle: "The United States is not debarred by any rule of international law from
governing the conduct of its own citizens upon the high seas or even in foreign
countries when the rights of other nations or their nationals are not infringed.
With respect to such an exercise of authority there is no question of international
law, but solely of the purport of the municipal law which establishes the duty of
the citizen in relation to his own government."
82. See, e.g., Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 1948), cert.
denied 336 U.S. 918 (1949), where the court held that a United States national
who had acted as a propagandist and radio announcer for Germany during World
War II, and who had been arrested in Germany by United States troops could be
tried for treason in the United States because he still owed allegiance to the United
States while he was in Germany; and Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962 (D.C.
Cir. 1950), where the defendant, also a United States citizen who had broadcast
propaganda for Nazi Germany, and who was later arrested by United States forces
in Germany, was convicted of treason by a federal court, being held to have been
under the same duty of allegiance to the United States while residing in a foreign
country with which the United States was at war.
83. In Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932), the defendant, a United
States citizen, was convicted upon his return to the United States for contempt of a
United States court for failure to obey a subpoena of the court directing him to re-
turn home from France to act as a witness for the United States government in a
criminal trial. In Sachs v. Government of the Canal Zone, 176 F.2d 292 (5th Cir.
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diction over most persons or objects within its boundaries, which all
States do, but that it limits the State to those exceptions, such as dis-
cussed above, allowed by the municipal law of the State itself.
All of the exceptions to the territorial principle as it applies to the
nationals of a State can also fall within the active personality or na-
tionality principle of jurisdiction.8 4  This theory allows a State to
assert jurisdiction over a national who commits or participates in the
commission of an offense beyond its territorial boundaries. The Re-
statement (Second) Foreign Relations Law of the United States rec-
ognizes this principle in Section 30(1): "A state has jurisdiction to
prescribe a rule of law (a) attaching legal consequences to conduct of
a national of the state wherever the conduct occurs. '8 5  This basis
of jurisdiction, used most with serious crimes such as treason or hom-
icide but which can be used for any conduct defined as criminal by
the State of nationality of the individual, allows a State competence
to assert jurisdiction over a much broader area of potential cases
than any of the exceptions to the territorial principle. When used
with the latter it greatly enlarges the scope of a State's jurisdiction.
As to the application of the territorial principle to aliens who have
committed crimes outside of a State which wants to assert jurisdiction
over them, the Anglo-American view is illustrated by the case of
United States v. Baker,8 6 which held that the United States had no
jurisdiction to try an alien for crimes in violation of United States
law which were committed outside of the boundaries of the United
States. The act in question was the falsifying of a material fact in a
matter within the jurisdiction of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service. 7
1949), a United States citizen was tried and convicted for a criminal libel which he
had composed in the Republic of Panama, a sovereign state, for publication and
circulation in the Canal Zone.
84. See, e.g., Skirotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73 (1941).
85. See Harvard Draft Convention on lurisdiction with Respect to Crime, art. 5,
29 AM. J. INT'L L. 439, 440 (1935 Supp.).
86. 136 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
87. The court in Baker distinguished the earlier case of United States ex. rel.
Mayka v. Palmer, 67 F.2d 146 (7th Cir. 1933), in which an alien was ordered de-
ported for having made false statements under oath to an American Consul abroad
when applying for a passport: "But deporting an alien for perjury is far different
from indicting and trying him for a crime committed abroad." 136 F. Supp. 546,
548 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
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Just as with crimes committed by nationals, however, the territorial
principle can be subject to modifications which will allow a State
to assert jurisdiction over aliens who have engaged in certain special
acts which were violations of the law of the State even though they
occurred outside of the State. A well-known but highly unusual
example is the case of William Joyce, better known to Allied service-
men in the European theater of World War Two as "Lord Haw-
Haw," a propagandist radio announcer for Nazi Germany.88 Joyce
was a national of the United States and, therefore, an alien to Brit-
ish courts. He did, however, have a British passport from July, 1933,
to July 1, 1940, having stated on the passport application that he
was a British subject by birth. Between some date in 1939, when he
left England, and July 1, 1940, when his passport expired, Joyce
began to broadcast on behalf of Germany. It was on the basis of
this period of time that the British courts found that Joyce had owed
a duty of allegiance to the British Crown, and having violated that
duty by making broadcasts on behalf of England's enemy, Joyce was
found guilty of treason and subsequently hanged. The possession
and use of even this illegal passport had given him certain rights under
British law and imposed upon him a corresponding duty of alle-
giance. ""
A more general means or exception utilized by the United States,
Great Britain, and other States which follow the territorial principle
in order to elude the restrictive nature of this theory and extend
their jurisdiction to aliens acting outside of the boundaries of the
States in question is the subjective-objective territorial principle.
Here the alien, although acting outside of the boundaries of a State,
is considered as having committed a crime within the territory of the
State which desires to assert jurisdiction over him. An obvious ex-
ample of this would be the situation of a Canadian national standing
in Canada who shoots a rifle at and kills a man standing across the
border in the United States. The crime, homicide, is considered as
having occurred in the United States, although the person responsible
88. Joyce v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 62 T.L.R. 208 (1946); A.C. 347.
89. Brierly refers to this as a "constructive" allegiance. BRIERLY, supra note
56, at 299. The American Law Institute's RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RE-
LATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES states that it "expresses no opinion" upon
the propriety or validity of such a theory. Id. at 88-89.
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for firing the rifle was physically in Canada at the time of the firing.
The jurisdiction in Canada would be called subjective, and the juris-
diction of the United States would be called objective."0
Included under the territorial principle is the concept known as
the law of the flag or "floating" territorial principle. Any vessel or
aircraft operating under the flag of a particular state is considered
to be part of that state for jurisdictional purposes and any act or event
occurring on board the vessel or aircraft is thereby within the juris-
diction of the flag State. This principle has been extended to space-
craft by Article VIII of the 1967 Space Treaty: "A State Party to
the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer space
is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and
over any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial
body." The territorial principle is not, of course, followed by all states.
Those which reject the concept of territory as a basis of jurisdiction
over events of a criminal or other important nature are free to choose
from a number of other theories, all of which are based upon factors
other than the location of the occurrence.
90. See, e.g., Rex v. Godfrey, [1923] 1 K.B. 24, where an English court ordered
a man in England to be extradicted to Switzerland to stand trial for having pro-
cured his partner who was in Switzerland to obtain goods in Switzerland by false
pretenses. The man who was in England had never been in Switzerland, but the
effects of his crime were felt there. The jurisdiction of the British court was
subjective while that of the Swiss court was objective. In Ford v. United States,
273 U.S. 593 (1927), the defendants, British subjects who had been in a British ship
on the high seas about 25 miles west of San Francisco at the time of its seizure
by United States authorities, were convicted of conspiracy to violate the United
States liquor laws pursuant to a treaty between the United States and England, au-
thorizing the United States to seize any British vessels and persons on such vessels
suspected of such violations. See also Charron v. United States, 412 F.2d 657 (9th
Cir. 1969). The subjective-objective territorial principle is recognized by the RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 18: "Ju-
risdiction to Prescribe with Respect to Effect within Territory."
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences
to conduct that occurs outside its territory if either-
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent elements
of a crime or tort under the law of states that have reasonably developed legal
systems, or
(b) (i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to which
the rule applies;
(ii) the effect within the territory is substantial;
(iii) it occurs as a direct and forseeable result of the conduct outside the terri-
tory; and
(iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of justice generally recog-
nized by states that have reasonably developed legal systems."
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One such theory allows a State to claim jurisdiction over a crime
in which the victim was a national of the State in question. This is
called the passive personality principle and is followed by some Eu-
ropean states and Turkey. The classic case demonstrating this the-
ory, and one of the most famous cases in international law, is the
Steamship Lotus,91 heard before the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice in 1927. In the Lotus case a French officer was tried
and convicted of manslaughter by a Turkish court for having caused
the deaths of eight Turkish nationals in a collision on the high seas
between the French ship on which he was watch officer at the time
of the collision and a Turkish vessel, on which were the Turkish na-
tionals. The officer was arrested after he had put ashore in Con-
stantinople. France and Turkey agreed to submit the case to the
Permanent Court, the former claiming that Turkey had no jurisdic-
tion to try the officer, the latter claiming that to do so was not in
violation of international law.92 The court held that no rule of
international law prevented Turkey from asserting jurisdiction over
the defendant since the effects of the offense were produced on
the Turkish vessel, which was considered under international law to
be part of Turkish territory. 3  The passive personality principle has
been repudiated by the Geneva Convention of 1958 on the High
Seas,94 which states in Article 11:
In the event of a collision or of any other incident of navigation concerning a ship
on the high seas, involving the penal or disciplinary responsibility of the master or
of any other person in the service of the ship, no penal or disciplinary proceedings
may be instituted against such persons except before the judicial or administrative
authorities either of the flag State or of the State of which such person is a national.
91. [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10.
92. Turkey claimed jurisdiction at least in part under article 6 of the then new
Penal Code of Turkey, which provided that any foreigner who committed an offense
abroad to the prejudice of Turkey or of a Turkish subject would be punished in
accordance with the Turkish Penal Code, provided that the minimum penalty
under Turkish law for the offense was one year's imprisonment and also that the
accused was arrested in Turkey. Hudson, The Sixth Year of the Permanent Court
of International Justice, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 10 (1928).
93. The decision in the Lotus case can be interpreted as a recognition by the
majority of the Permanent Court of either the objective territorial principle
(BRIERLY, supra note 56, at 303) or what has been referred to as the impact
territorial principle (McDOUGAL, LASSWELL & VLASIC, supra note 8, at 699).
(The impact territorial principle is discussed here infra note 98). The passive
personality principle, however, was the theory behind at least part of article 6 of the
Turkish Penal Code.
94. Convention on the High Seas [hereinafter referred to as the High Seas
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While the treaty therefore limits the possible basis of jurisdiction
to either the law of the flag or active personality theories, it only
applies to collisions at sea and similar incidents and does not prevent
the use of the passive personality principle for other types of cases.
The principle, therefore, must continue to be considered as a possible
basis of a jurisdictional claim by a State over an alien who has been
accused by the State of committing a criminal act, as defined by the
State's own laws, against one of its nationals outside of its territorial
boundaries. 95
Another theory of jurisdiction which may be used where an act
committed outside of a State is of such importance to the interests
of the State that it desires to assert jurisdiction over the event is the
protective or protected interest principle. It is stated in one possible
form by Section 33 of the Restatement (Second) Foreign Relations
Law of the United States:
(1) A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal conse-
quences to conduct outside its territory that threatens its security as a state or the
operation of its governmental functions, provided the conduct is generally recog-
nized as a crime under the law of states that have reasonably developed legal
systems.
(2) Conduct referred to in Subsection (1) includes in particular the counter-
feiting of the state's seals and currency, and the falsification of its official documents.
This principle can be considered as a much broader application of
the passive personality principle, going beyond the protection of na-
tionals to include the protection of national-state interests, 6 and it
has been used by United States courts a number of times.9 7  While
Treaty], done at Geneva April 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2313, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450
U.N.T.S. 82.
95. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES repudiates the use of the passive personality principle in § 18(2): "A state
does not have jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to
conduct of an alien outside its territory merely on the ground that the conduct
affects one of its nationals." The Harvard Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with
Respect to Crime, while listing in the Introductory Comment the passive personality
principle as being one of the five general principles of penal jurisdiction in use
throughout the world by states, does not include it in the text of the Draft Conven-
tion itself: "The (passive personality principle) . . . is admittedly auxiliary in
character and is probably not essential for any State if the ends served are ade-
quately provided for on other principles." 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435, 445 (Supp.
1935).
96. STEIN & HAY, LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE ATLANTIC AREA 684 (1963).
97. See, e.g., United States v. Archer, 51 F. Supp. 708 (S.D. Cal. 1943), where
the issue arose whether an alien who had falsely sworn before a vice consul of the
648
1971] OUTER SPACE CONFLICTS 649
the protective principle and some of the various exceptions to the
territorial principle seem to arrive at the same results when each is
applied to specific cases, it should be appreciated that the protective
principle will allow a State a greater latitude of jurisdiction with less
legal maneuvering than the territorial theory exceptions. Such a the-
ory may have distinct advantages in the Space Age, when science
and technology pose new challenges to traditional concepts of terri-
toriality.
The United States, although it has used the protective theory in
certain cases, still adheres to the territorial and active personality the-
ories in most other cases. 8 Other States may rely upon various other
United States at an American Consulate in Mexico could be prosecuted in the
United States under a statute making such false swearing a crime. The court an-
swered the question in the affirmative, stating that "any person who takes a false
oath before a consul commits an offense, not against the country where the consul is,
but against the sovereignty of the United States" (court's emphasis). Id. at 711.
Although the court supported its decision, in part, by alluding to the fact that the
United States Consulate was considered as American territory (and therefore in-
voking the territorial principle), a fiction which has come under criticism (see, e.g.,
BRIERLY, supra note 56, at 222), the decision could have been supported entirely by
the protective principle. In a similar case, United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp.
479 (S.D. Cal. 1960), defendants had made false statements to United States offi-
cials outside of United States territory in order to obtain status as non-quota immi-
grants. The court stated that "Congress may (from the body of international law)
pick and choose whatever recognized principle of international jurisdiction is neces-
sary to accomplish the purpose sought by (its) legislation." Id. at 491. The fact
that Congress had generally adhered to the territorial principle did not prevent it
from adopting the protective principle where it saw fit to do so. In a third case,
Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 948
(1961), the defendants had conspired to enter the United States illegally as immi-
grants with preferred status based upon "sham" marriages to American citizens.
Again relying upon the protective principle, the court cited the Rodriguez case and
stated that "the powers of the government and the Congress in regard to sovereignty
(court's emphasis) are broader than the powers possessed in relation to internal
matters." Id. at 549. A very recent case utilized the protective principle to apply
certain provisions of the Securities Exchange Act to transactions taking place out-
side the United States which are detrimental to the interests of American investors,
if the transactions involve stock registered and listed on a national (United States)
securities exchange. Shoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2nd Cir. 1968).
98. The United States has also used what has been referred to as the impact
territoriality principle. McDOUGAL, LASSWELL & VLASIC, supra note 8, at 700.
This theory, which may be included among certain of the exceptions to the terri-
torial principle or under § 18 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES, supra note 90, and which is nearly identical to the protective
principle, allows a state to claim jurisdiction over alien persons or corporations who
have committed offenses outside of the state's territorial boundaries if the offense
produces a substantial impact upon the state's territorial community. The United
States has used this principle in certain anti-trust cases, such as United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), in which the defendant
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combinations of the theories outlined above. Not all States recognize
all theories of jurisdiction, and many writers on international law
question the validity of some of the principles. 9  All States and
writers do, however, agree that there exist certain types of offenses
which due to their very nature constitute a threat to all men and
States everywhere and for that reason are subject to the jurisdictional
claims of any and all States at any time under what is usually referred
to as the universality principle of jurisdiction.
This last and most special of jurisdictional theories applies ex-
clusively to crimes and offenses considered as being not only against
the interests of one or a few States, but against the interests of all
States and the individuals who belong to them. Although the Nur-
emberg Trials are probably the most dramatic example of the appli-
cation of the universality principle, the principle was in use long
before that for crimes such as piracy.
One of the oldest of offenses, piracy, was regarded as detrimental
Canadian corporation was charged with certain violations of the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act relating to attempts to restrain and monopolize interstate and foreign
commerce of the United States. In regard to those acts committed by defendant
outside of the United States territorial jurisdiction Judge Learned Hand said: "Did
either the agreement of 1931 or that of 1936 violate sec. 1 of the Act? The
answer does not depend upon whether we shall recognize as a source of liability a
liability imposed by another state. On the contrary we are concerned only with
whether Congress chose to attach liability to the conduct outside the United States
of persons not in allegiance to it. That being so, the only question open is whether
Congress intended to impose the liability, and whether our own Constitution per-
mitted it to do so: as a court of the United States, we cannot look beyond our own
law. Nevertheless, it is quite true that we are not to read general words, such as
those in this act, without regard to the limitations customarily observed by nations
upon the exercise of their powers. . . . We should not impute to Congress an intent
to punish all whom its courts can catch, for conduct which has no consequences
within the United States. . . . On the other hand, it is settled law . . . that any
state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct
outside its borders that has consequences within its borders which the state repre-
hends; and these liabilities other states will ordinarily recognize. . . . Both agree-
ments would clearly have been unlawful, had they been made within the United
States; and it follows from what we have just said that both were unlawful, though
made abroad, if they were intended to affect imports and did affect them."
Id. at 443, 444.
This so-called "Rule of the Alcoa Case" has been criticized as not being part
of international law. STEIN & HAY, supra note 96, at 684.
99. Brierly, for example, expresses disapproval of the passive personality princi-
ple. BRIERLY, supra note 56, at 302. See also Fitzgerald, The Territorial Princi-
ple in Penal Law: An Attempted Justification 1 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 29, 43
(1970).
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to all men everywhere-"(P)irata est hostis humani generis."' 1°  It
was early established that pirates could be pursued, captured, tried,
and punished by any state able to do so, whether or not the pirate
sailed ostensibly under the flag of some State.'01 The act of piracy
caused the individuals and their vessel to lose ipso facto the protec-
tion of their State flag and national character. The capturing State
could then try the pirate under its own municipal law.10 2
Slave trading, although not originally proscribed by customary
international law, has, through the acceptance by most States of a
number of treaties entered into by various States in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, become almost universally condemned
by States everywhere.103
Individuals, although not subjects of international law, have, there-
fore, been made subject to certain international duties, the violation
of which will make the offender individually subject to punishment
under international law, although it is a state or group of states which
will usually render the punishment as there is, as stated earlier, no
world executive body to administer the punishment. Perhaps the
best example of this occurred after World War II when the victorious
allied States sought a basis of jurisdiction in order to try those Nazi
officials who had participated in acts of genocide and inhumanity
committed upon the Jewish and other peoples found within Nazi
occupied territory. The allies had only to look to the universality
principle of jurisdiction as it had been used for piracy and some
war crimes in the past.104  The charter annexed to the Agree-
ment of August 8, 1945, for Prosecution and Punishment of the
Major War Criminals of the European Axis, which set up the
100. Harvard Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime (Com-
ment to Article 9), 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435, 566 (Supp. 1935), quoting Coke, C.J.
in King v. Marsh, 3 Bulstr. 27, 81 Eng. Rep. 23 (1615).
101. OPPENHEIM, supra note 56, at 330.
102. Id. at 616. See also High Seas Treaty, art. 14-22.
103. OPPENHEIM, supra note 56, at 733-35. See also High Seas Treaty, art. 13,
22(1)(b).
104. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 56, at 850 n.1, for an example from World War
I. See also WILKES, Courts of International Criminal Jurisdiction, WORLD PEACE
THROUGH LAw-THE WASHINGTON WORLD CONFERENCE 792, 799-800 (1967), for an
interesting chronology of international criminal tribunals and the Draft Statute for
an International Criminal Court, from the Report of the 1953 Committee on Inter-
national Criminal Jurisdiction, General Assembly Official Records, IX, Supp. 12
(A/2645) 23-26 (1954); and Klein and Wilkes, United Nations Draft Statutes for
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Nuremberg International Tribunal, merely applied the concept of in-
dividual responsibility, long established for acts such as piracy, to the
war crimes and "crimes against humanity" (genocide, human experi-
ments, etc.) which the Nazi officials were charged with having com-
mitted.10 5 The words of the Tribunal are quite clear on this basic
principle underlying the Nuremberg Trials:
It was submitted that international law is concerned with the actions of sovereign
States, and provides no punishment for individuals; and further, that where the act
in question is an act of State, those who carry it out are not personally responsible,
but are protected by the doctrine of the sovereignty of the State. In the opinion of
the Tribunal, both these submissions must be rejected. . . . Crimes against inter-
national law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing
individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be
enforced.106
The universality principle, although the least used of the previously
discussed basis of jurisdiction, is no doubt the most important from a
world-wide view.'1 7  The recent plague of air piracy, having grown
steadily over the past decade, illustrates one area where the uni-
versality principle can be applied with great effectiveness.108 The
possibility of such crimes infecting the space arena during the next
thirty years presents an ominous specter when one considers that in
an International Criminal Court; An American Evaluation, prepared on behalf of
the American National Section of the International Association of Penal Law, at
the Comparative Criminal Law Project and the Institute of Judicial Administration,
New York University. Both documents may be found in MUELLER and WISE,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, 513, 526 (1965).
105. OPPENHEIM, supra note 56, at 341.
106. Id. at 342.
107. WILKES, supra note 104, at 798.
108. Although extradition of air pirates has often been suggested as an appro-
priate solution to international air piracy, it does have its limitations, one of the
most serious of which is the situation in which the air pirates ask for political
asylum in the state where the aircraft lands. States generally do not want to
deny political asylum to individuals who qualify for it, especially if the individuals
are fleeing from a state hostile or unfriendly to the asylum state. Nevertheless,
air pirates must be punished by some governmental entity if international air com-
merce is to remain healthy. In such cases where the state holding the air pirates
desires to grant them political asylum, it can itself try the individuals by invoking
the universality principle. Aut dedere aut punire. See Bassiouni, World Public Or-
der and Extradition: A Conceptual Evaluation, as found in AKTUELLE PROBLEME
DES INTERNATIONAL-STRAFRECHTS, 10-18 (Oehler and Potz ed. 1970). This was done
recently by West Germany in the case of eight young Czech nationals who had
forced a Czech airliner to land in West Germany. The Czechs were granted
asylum by West Germany but were then tried, found guilty, and sentenced to jail
terms for the acts they had committed. In this way two oft times incompatible mas-
ters were served: national political interests (the granting of asylum to people flee-
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the not-too-distant future there will be regularly scheduled commer-
cial spaceflights from the Earth to orbiting space stations, the Moon,
and, eventually, beyond. Oppenheim also recognized the potential
importance of the universality principle to the Space Age: "The in-
creasing complexities of modem international relations, in particular
having regard to the unlimited potentialities of scientific weapons
of destruction, may call for far-reaching extensions of individual re-
sponsibility expressly declared by International law."'1 9
As the preceding discussion indicates, the area of State criminal
jurisdiction over individuals acting outside of the boundaries of the
State in question can be quite involved. 110 As men and women from
the planet Earth move into outer space and establish space stations
and bases both in orbit around and on celestial bodies the questions
of which State may assert jurisdiction over individuals who have been
accused of crimes in outer space will only become more complex.
Tortious acts which occur in outer space will also be of great inter-
est to States, even though torts by their very nature are less important
to the interests of States than are crimes. Crimes are acts so detri-
mental to the best interests of States that the States themselves will,
through their governmental arms, prosecute the wrongdoers, while
torts are generally more detrimental to the best interests of only one
or a relatively small group of a State's nationals so that the State will
ing from the Iron Curtain) and international law (the punishing of air pirates).
See Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 21, 1970, at 10, col. 1. For a discussion of
the political offense exception to extradition, see Bassiouni, Ideologically Motivated
Offenses and the Political Offense Exception in Extradition-A Proposed Juridical
Standard for an Unruly Problem, 19 DEPAUL L. REV. 217 (1969).
On December 16, 1970, the member states of the International Civil Aviation Or-
ganization completed the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft. As of January 21, 1971, 51 states had become signatories to the Conven-
tion, which is reprinted in 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 133 (1971). Article 7 of
the Convention affirms the principle of aut dedere aut punire.
109. OPPENHEIM, supra note 56, at 342.
110. One of the most unusual cases in the history of international criminal
jurisdiction is the Eichmann case. Due to the facts that: Eichmann's crimes were
all committed outside of Israel; Israel was not even in existence as an independent
and sovereign state at the time; and none of the six million or so victims could
therefore have been Israeli nationals at the time the crimes were committed, none
of the recognized principles of jurisdiction discussed above, with the exception of
the universality principle, can be precisely applied to the situation. Note, When
Extradition Fails, Is Abduction the Solution?, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 127 (1961). How-
ever, the protective (protected interest) principle would seem to be closest to
fitting the circumstances. See Bassiouni, International Extradition in American
Practice and World Public Order, 36 TENN. L. REV. 1, 9 (1968).
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not prosecute the wrongdoer itself but will only afford a means by
which its nationals may prosecute the wrongdoer under State law.
Nevertheless, nations have an interest in seeing that their nationals
who have been the victims of serious tortious conduct committed
outside of their territorial boundaries will be able to secure some
remedy against the wrongdoers. In addition to this there are many
acts which are actually on the borderline between torts and crimes
and may be defined as either. In such instances there is what may be
referred to as a "merging" of the tort and criminal concepts. In the
Lotus case, for example, the French Lieutenant, Demons, was
charged with what most common law systems would refer to as in-
voluntary manslaughter, a crime involving a high degree of negli-
gence."' It is possible that another State may have defined such
conduct as only tortious and not criminal, but even if that were the
case the State in all probability would still have asserted jurisdiction
over Demons in order that he might be subjected to civil liability for
the death of the State's nationals. Tortious acts of such significance
may be subject to any of the theories used for criminal acts, giving
rise to jurisdictional conflicts between States. A simplified ex-
ample of such can be demonstrated by the following hypothetical,
but entirely possible, situation:
11. The decision of the Permanent Court did not mention the specific section
or sections of the TURKISH CRIMINAL CODE (effective July 1, 1926) with which
Demons was charged with having violated, but either of the following sections
may have been applicable:
§ 383 Whoever causes a fire, explosion, ship-wreck, sea accident or any de-
struction or calamity comprising a public danger, as a result of imprudence, care-
lessness, inexperience in one's profession or trade, or disobedience to regulations,
orders or rules, shall be imprisoned for not more than thirty months and a heavy
fine of not more than 100 liras shall be imposed.
The punishment shall be imprisonment for six months to five years and a heavy
fine of 50 to 150 liras in case the above-mentioned offense has resulted in danger
to a person's life, and heavy imprisonment for not more than five years and by a
heavy fine 100 to 500 liras in case the same offense has resulted in a person's death.
§ 455 Whoever causes the death of a person through negligence or carelessness
or inexperience in his profession or trade or inobedience to regulations, orders or
instructions, shall be punished by imprisonment for two to five years and by a
heavy fine of 250 to 2,500 liras.
Where his act has caused more than one person's death, or one person's death and
one or more person's injury and if this injury has been in the degree specified in
the second paragraph of Article 456, he shall be punished by imprisonment for
four to ten years and by heavy fine of not less than 1,000 liras.
See The American Series of Foreign Penal Codes, The Turkish Criminal Code,
9 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, SCHOOL OF LAW, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW PROJECT,
145-46 (1965).
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A space station of United States registry and operating entirely under the
United States flag is orbiting Earth in the late 1980's. The station is used for pur-
poses of telecommunication, navigation, weather forecasting, and research in the
fields of astronomy, communications, and medicine. Although the daily operations
of the station are carried on exclusively by United States nationals, the research is
conducted by scientists and engineers from many states. A space shuttlecraft owned
by the Soviet Union and operated under the Soviet flag is approaching the station
for rendezvous and docking, after having first received permission to do so from the
station's commander. Due to either an error by the Soviet crew or a malfunction
in the shuttlecraft's guidance equipment, which was actually made in East Germany,
the passenger section of the shuttlecraft collides with the research section of the
station, in which a number of scientists are working at the time.
None of the American crew members are killed or seriously injured, but several
scientists who are nationals of Ghana, Brazil, and Canada are killed, along with
some Canadian and Japanese governmental officials who were visiting the station at
the time. Great damage was done to the research section of the station, and scien-
tific equipment belonging to Canada, Japan, and a space research organization
composed of Ghana and a number of other African states is completely destroyed.
The research projects are set back over a year in most cases.
On the Soviet shuttlecraft none of the Soviet crew members are killed or seriously
injured, but passengers who are nationals of Poland, France, and Pakistan are injured
in various degrees, and one Yugoslavian governmental official is killed.
After the collision the Soviet shuttlecraft, although badly damaged in the passen-
ger section, remains operative and is able to travel several hundred miles through
space to rendezvous and dock, safely, with a research space station owned and oper-
ated by the European Space Research Organization. Docking with the damaged
American space station was deemed impossible by the station's commander after
the collision. After having docked at the ESRO station the Soviet crew and the
passengers of the Soviet ship transfer from the ship to the station to receive medical
care and await the arrival of a shuttlecraft from Earth. The commander of the
ESRO station informs the Soviet crew that they are under what the commander
refers to as "protective custody."
Based upon the above facts the following jurisdictional claims could
be made over the pilot and crew members responsible, or allegedly
responsible, for the collision:
1. The United States claims jurisdiction on the basis of the protected interest prin-
ciple, since the damage to the station, which was under the United States flag, could
be detrimental to important United States economic, prestige, and, perhaps, na-
tional security interests. Similarly, Canada, Japan, and the African states belonging
to the African space research organization, all of whom lost important and valuable
scientific research equipment in the collision, could utilize the protected interest
principle under the same rationale. Alternatively, the United States might be able
to claim jurisdiction on the basis of the subjective-objective territorial theory since
the act or acts of the Soviet pilot and/or crew which allegedly caused the collision,
although done on the Soviet shuttlecraft, produced effects on board the United
States space station and even in the United States itself.
2. Ghana, Brazil, Canada, Japan and Yugoslavia, all of whose nationals were
killed in the collision, could claim jurisdiction under the passive personality theory,
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as could Poland, France and Paikstan, whose nationals were injured. All of these
states might also utilize the protected interest principle since the death or injury of
scientists or governmental officials could be considered as detrimental to a state's
important national interests.
3. The Soviet Union, of course, would have no problem in claiming jurisdiction
over the pilot and crew of the shuttlecraft since a state may prescribe and
apply rules of conduct to its nationals whenever they may be under the active
personality theory. If American crewmen of the United States space station were
suspected of being responsible for the collision they could similarly be subject to
the jurisdiction of United States courts.
4. Each state involved in the research projects could utilize the protected interest
principle since the successful completion of the projects might be considered of
great importance to each state's national interests.
In addition to the Soviet pilot and crew being held responsible for
the accident, the Soviet Union itself might be charged with liability.
Also, since East Germany was the builder of the guidance equipment
of the shuttlecraft, it too might incur responsibility for the disaster
if the guidance equipment, and not the Soviet pilot or crew, were the
cause of the accident.
Although this example is intended to demonstrate how possible
jurisdictional disputes could arise in outer space in regard to tortious
or criminal conduct, it does open the door to other questions involv-
ing both substantive and procedural issues related to the question of
liability. Some of these issues are the following: 1) What theory of
liability should be used? (e.g., absolute liability, negligence, etc.);
2) How should liability be apportioned if more than one state or in-
ternational organization were found to be responsible, and, if an in-
ternational organization was involved, how should liability be appor-
tioned among the states' members of that organization? 3) Should
there be a maximum limit on damages? 4) What court should hear
and decide the case?' 12  It is the last of these issues, namely, what
court should be the proper forum for such cases, that comprises the
main focus for this article. It is not difficult to see that there is no
simple and direct answer to this question when there is a factual situa-
tion as involved as the one described above.
SITUATIONS IN WHICH MUNICIPAL COURT JURISDICTION IS INADEQUATE
Potentially more important than either tortious or criminal con-
duct committed by individuals is that conduct which is under-
112. For a more thorough examination of the various aspects of the question of
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taken by States themselves, usually through their official agencies,
which threatens the interests of other States. These "national" torts
or crimes can be very harmful to the maintenance of peaceful rela-
tions between States. Examples include boundary disputes, fishing
rights disputes, pollution and other similar matters. Modern scien-
tific and technological developments can be used by governments
either intentionally or unintentionally to interfere with such things
as privacy or telecommunications. Large numbers of nationals of
other States and the official activities of other States may be affected
by such acts. In such cases the courts of the States being harmed by
the activities will often not be able to get jurisdiction over the re-
sponsible individuals due to the fact that the objectionable activities
may be entirely carried out within the offending State. If the States
involved in such disputes cannot resolve the matter by diplomacy,
the matter should be submitted to an international court for either an
advisory or an adjudicatory proceeding.
An example of just such an occurrence arising out of an activity
brought about by modern technology was the Trail Smelter Arbitra-
tion case.11 The dispute arose between the United States and Can-
ada and involved a lead and zinc smelter operated by a Canadian cor-
poration in British Columbia under authorization from Canadian
officials. The smelter emitted great quantities of sulphur dioxide
fumes into the atmosphere causing damage to property on the Amer-
ican side of the border in the state of Washington. Both sides agreed
to set up a special tribunal to resolve the matter. The tribunal found
that Canada was responsible for the damage to United States prop-
erty and ordered indemnification paid to the United States as well
as steps taken by Canadian officials to reduce the amount of pollu-
tion.
The Space Age will bring an acceleration of the number and kinds
of such national or governmental offenses. Pollution, only recently
having been given the attention it deserves as a serious problem on
Earth, may present some rather unique problems in outer space as a
liability for space activities see Dembling, A Liability Treaty for Outer Space
Activities, 19 AM. U.L. REV. 33 (1969), and Nanda, Liability for Space Activities,
41 COLO. L. REV. 509 (1969).
113. Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada), Decision of.Mar. 11,
1941, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, 8 ARB. SER. (1941); 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684 (1941).
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result of either intentional or unintentional activities by States. Pri-
vacy of States and their nationals may be seriously threatened by spy
satellites. Interference with telecommunications may present unu-
sual but serious problems, and liability and natural resource disputes
loom on the horizon. In addition to these areas, disputes between
States in regard to treaty interpretation and jurisdictional claims, the
latter being illustrated by the Lotus case and the hypothetical exam-
ple above, will provide situations in which municipal courts either
cannot or should not assert jurisdiction, due to their inherent bias to-
ward their own State. It is in such cases that an international court
will prove to be the most reliable way to peacefully decide the dispute.
Before examining the present ability of the International Court of
Justice to handle any space or space-related disputes which may arise
in the near future and presenting proposals to make the court more
effective as a tool of world peace both on Earth and in outer space,
it will be necessary to explore the current nature and operation of the
court.
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
The International Court of Justice, located at the Hague, Nether-
lands, was created in 1945 by the United Nations Charter, which is a
multilateral convention to which 127 States are parties at the present
time. Unlike its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International
Justice, which was in existence from 1920 to 1946 and was active
between 1922 and 1939, the present court is an integral part of the
organization which created it. Article 92 of the United Nations
Charter states: "The International Court of Justice shall be the prin-
ciple judicial organ of the United Nations. It shall function in ac-
cordance with the annexed Statute, which is based upon the Statute
of the Permanent Court of International Justice and forms an in-
tegral part of the present Charter." And Article 1 of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice (hereinafter termed the Statute)
states: "The International Court of Justice established by the Charter
of the United Nations as the principle judicial organ of the United
Nations shall be constituted and shall function in accordance with
the provisions of the present Statute."
The court consists of fifteen judges, no two of whom may be na-
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tionals of the same State." 4 A quorum for the court consists of nine
judges." 5  The judges are elected by the General Assembly and the
Security Council from names nominated by national groups. 116 To
be elected to the court the judges must "possess the qualifications re-
quired in their respective countries for appointment to the highest
judicial offices, or (be) juris-consults of recognized competence in
international law.""' 7 The term of election is generally nine years."18
No judge "may exercise any political or administrative function, or
engage in any other occupation of a professional nature," 1 9 nor
may any judge act as agent, counsel, or advocate in any case.120
When engaged in the business of the court, the judges are accorded
diplomatic privileges and immunities. 12' They are paid salaries
which are determined by the General Assembly122 and which along
with various allowances and compensation allowed by the Statute
are free from all taxation. 1 23  Although seated at the Hague, the
court may sit and exercise its functions wherever it considers it to be
desirable.1 24  The court makes its own rules of procedure 25 and may
propose amendments to its Statute to the General Assembly, 26 al-
though any amendments to such, as to the United Nations Charter
of which the Statute is a part, must be passed by the General As-
sembly itself.127  In order to decide a case a simple majority is
needed, with the President of the court casting the last vote in case
of a tie.' 28  As nine judges constitute a quorum, a minimum of five
judges therefore is necessary to decide a case.
Article 59 of the Statute states that a decision of the court has no
114. I.C.J. STAT. art. 3.
115. Id. at art. 25, para. 3.
116. Id. at art. 4.
117. Id. at art. 2.
118. Id. at art. 13, para. 1.
119. Id. at art. 16, para. 1.
120. Id. at art. 17, para. 1.
121. Id. at art. 19.
122. ld. at art. 32.
123. Id. at art. 32, para. 8.
124. Id. at art. 22, para. 1.
125. ld. at art. 30.
126. Id. at art. 70.
127. Id. at art. 69.
128. Id. at art. 55.
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binding force except between the parties and in respect of the par-
ticular case. Except for the situation where an advisory opinion is
asked by a competent international organization,'12 only States may
be parties in cases before the court.'80 This does not confer juris-
diction upon the court in regard to any particular dispute but only
opens the court to those states which wish to submit cases to it.'
When a State has submitted a case to the court it has the right to
have a judge of its own nationality on the case, if it does not have a
judge of its nationality on the court already.'1 2
States which are members of the United Nations are ipso facto
parties to the Statute' and are therefore free to bring a case before
the court at any time. States which are not members of the United
Nations may become parties to the Statute on conditions which are
determined in each case by the General Assembly upon the recom-
mendation of the Security Council. 8 4  This is further elaborated by
Article 35(2) of the Statute: "The conditions under which the
Court shall be open to other states shall, subject to the special provi-
sions contained in treaties in force, be laid down by the Security
Council, but in no case shall such provisions place the parties in a
position of inequality before the Court."'1 5
States which are not United Nations members must contribute an
amount toward the expenses of the court, unless, the state is already
bearing a share of such costs.3'3  As of January 1, 1971, 48 States
had accepted the jurisdiction of the court under Article 36(2) of the
Statute,' 37 with notable exceptions being the Soviet Union and her
satellite states. All but four of the States which have accepted the
129. See infra note 157.
130. I.C.J. STAT. art. 34, para. 1.
131. SHIHATA, THE POWER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT TO DETERMINE ITS
OWN JURISDICTION: COMPETENCE DE LA COMPETENCE 89, 90 (1965).
132. I.C.J. STAT. art. 31.
133. U.N. CHARTER art. 93, para. 1; and I.C.J. STAT. art. 35, para. 1.
134. U.N. CHARTER art. 93, para. 2.
135. States not members of the United Nations which have become parties to
the Statute of the International Court of Justice pursuant to resolutions adopted by
the General Assembly are Liechtenstein, San Marino, and Switzerland. U.S. Dept.
of State, TREATIES IN FORCE 316 (Jan. 1, 1971).
136. IC.J. STAT. art. 35, para. 3.
137. U.S. Dept. of State, TREATIES IN FORCE 317 (Jan. 1, 1971).
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court's jurisdiction, however, have attached conditions to their ac-
ceptance. 8 "
In order to bring a case before the court a State must rely upon
one of two things: 1) A special agreement between itself and the
other State or States involved in the dispute; or 2) a unilateral appli-
cation for the Court to assert jurisdiction over the case. This in turn
relies upon either: (a) A prior jurisdictional instrument by which
the other party or parties to the dispute have submitted such cases
to the Court's jurisdiction; or (b) is merely an invitation, in the ab-
sence of the above, to the other party or parties to accept the juris-
diction of the Court in this particular case.' 89
Article 40(1) of the Statute sets forth both of these methods:
"Cases are brought before the Court, as the case may be, either by
the notification of the special agreement or by a written application
addressed to the Registrar (of the Court). In either case the subject
of the dispute and the parties shall be indicated." After a case is
submitted to the court the next step, and the most important one in
the whole process from initial submission of the case to final dispo-
sition of the merits, if the case goes that far, is the determination by
the court of whether it has substantive jurisdiction over the case.
COMPETENCE DE LA COMPETENCE
The power of the court to decide initially and exclusively whether
it has substantive jurisdiction over a case is called competence de la
competence. It is without a doubt the most important single power
conferred upon the court 4 ° and is based upon Article 36(6) of the
Statute: "In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has juris-
diction, the matter shall be settled by decision of the Court." This
power, the exercise of which is the first function the court undertakes
in both advisory and contentious cases, involves a wide discretion
on the part of the court but is neither absolute nor arbitrary.' 4' It
is limited, in fact, to the extent to which the parties to the dispute
have submitted the dispute to the court's jurisdiction, since the court
138. The four states are Haiti, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Id.
139. Supra note 131, at 84, 85.
140. Supra note 131, at 271.
141. Supra note 131, at 187.
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founds its jurisdiction solely on the consent of the parties. However,
the court is not, in the matter of deciding whether the parties have
consented to its jurisdiction, as subject to the mere whims of the par-
ties as would seem to be the case upon superficial examination. The
court interprets the jurisdictional instruments and the conduct of the
parties and determines for itself whether the parties consented. 142
The jurisdictional instruments may be treaties or other documents by
which a State accepts the court's jurisdiction over either one specific
case or any number of cases to which it either is currently or might
in the future be a party. The court will use them to determine either
if it has substantive jurisdiction over a case, or in the event that it
already has such, whether that substantive jurisdiction will be subse-
quently affected by the instrument."14  The conduct referred to above
is often called the jurisdictional facts of the case and may be used in
the same manner as the jurisdictional instruments.4 It is from the
jurisdictional facts and instruments that the court determines whether
substantive jurisdiction has been conferred on it by the parties to the
dispute.
The International Court of Justice is the only organ of the United
Nations entitled by explicit provision to determine its own jurisdic-
tion. 45  If the court decides that it does, the case proceeds to the
merits. If it decides that it does not, then the case will usually be
dismissed unless the parties remedy the defect themselves. In all
cases, however, regardless of whether or not the court finds that it
has substantive jurisdiction over a matter, the court will exercise the
power conferred on it in Article 36(6) of the Statute. 46
The court's competence de la competence is not immune from
challenge, however, as some mutual declarations of acceptance, 47
which are one way in which a state may accept the jurisdiction of the
court for disputes which may arise in the future, contain clauses
which declare that the State will decide for itself whether the court
142. Supra note 131, at 205.
143. Supra note 131, at 106.
144. Supra note 131, at 106.
145. Supra note 131, at 38 n.1. According to Shihata, no international court
with continued jurisdiction has been established without this power. Supra
note 131, at 30.
146. Supra note 131, at 300.
147. I.C.J. STAT. art. 36, para. 2.
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has jurisdiction over a case ostensibly covered by the declaration of
acceptance.14 An example of such a reservation is found in the
August 14, 1946 declaration of the United States by which it sub-
mitted to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice:
All legal disputes hereafter arising concerning:
a) the interpretation of a treaty;
b) any question of international law;
c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of
an international obligation;
d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an
international obligation;
Provided, that this declaration shall not apply to...
b) disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of the United States of America as determined by the United States of
America (emphasis supplied); .... 149
The eight words "as determined by the United States of America"
are the well-known Connally Amendment. It purports to declare
that the United States will determine which disputes, to which it is a
party, may be decided by the International Court of Justice. As Ar-
ticle 36(6) gives the court this power, the Connally Amendment is a
challenge to the competence de la competence of the court, since
there can be no concurrent jurisdiction between the United States or
any other State and the court in the matter of the determination of
the court's substantive jurisdiction.
The Connally Amendment and other such reservations to the
court's power under Article 36(6) of the Statute have been much
criticized. 5 ' That all states with such reservations should repudiate
them is supported by the following argument of Hans Kelsen:
The opinion of a party that the law which the tribunal has to apply to the conflict
is unsatisfactory cannot be a legitimate reason for excluding the conflict from judi-
cial decision or arbitration, and that means from the application of existing (in-
ternational) law. For such an opinion is based on a subjective value judgment of the
interested party. And even if there were a more or less objective criterion for de-
termining the alleged insufficiency of the law, which there is not, such insuffi-
ciency could never justify the non-application of the law.1 5 '
148. States with such clauses are the United States, Liberia, Mexico, and Sudan
(South Africa, which had such a clause, is no longer a member of the Statute).
Supra note 131, at 274-75.
149. Declaration on the Part of the United States of America, done Aug. 14,
1946, 61 Stat. 1218, T.I.A.S. No. 1598, 1 U.N.T.S. 9.
150. GRIEVES, SUPRANATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 97 (1969).
151. Kelsen, supra note 51, at 404.
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Although writing before the Connally Amendment was implemented
through the declaration of August 14, 1946, Kelsen, referring gen-
erally to the reluctance of States to submit international matters to
international courts, points out one of the objections to the Connally
Amendment and other such reservations found in mutual declarations
of acceptance, namely, the political and social bias of states in dis-
putes to which they are parties and the resulting inability of the states
to make a fair and rational judgment on the issues. Kelsen states
another objection:
There are no questions which, by their very nature, are "solely within the do-
mestic jurisdiction" of a State. That a dispute between States arises out of a matter
which "by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction" of one of the
parties means nothing else but that international law does not obligate that party to
behave in the way claimed by the other party and consequently that the former has,
according to international law, a right to repudiate the claim of the latter. 152
In this way international law is applied to the case. The Court by
exercising competence de la competence based upon Article 36(6)
of the Statute decides this initial and most important question.
To those who would argue that the abolishment of reservations
to the court's jurisdiction such as the Connally Amendment from
their declarations of acceptance would leave the court free to meddle
in the genuinely domestic affairs of a State, it must be pointed
out that the exercise of the court's power under Article 36(6) of the
152. Kelsen, supra note 51, at 405. A third objection to such reservations to
mutual declarations of acceptance is their "boomerang" nature, allowing other states
to defeat the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice by invoking the
complaining state's reservation. See, e.g., Case of Certain Norwegian Loans
(France v. Norway), [1957] I.C.J. REP. 9, at 22, in which France sued Norway
over the latter's refusal to pay certain bonds in gold. Norway invoked France's
reservation, which was very similar to the Connally Amendment, against France and
defeated the court's jurisdiction by claiming that the matter was within the domestic
jurisdiction of France. Similarly, when the United States sought to have a case ad-
judicated in the International Court of Justice involving the death of six American
nationals resulting from the shooting down by Bulgarian military aircraft of the Is-
raeli (El Al) civil airliner in which they were on after the airliner had allegedly
been driven off its course by strong winds and innocently put over Bulgarian terri-
tory, Bulgaria invoked the Connally Amendment and caused the United States to
withdraw the case. Aerial Incident of 27 July, 1955, [1959) I.C.J. REP. 127. See
also Gross, Bulgaria Invokes the Connally Amendment, 56 AM. J. INIT'L L. 357
(1962). Such potential future use of the Connally Amendment has caused one
author to state that "(w)hat the United States has done then, in effect, as to arm
every country in the world with the provisions of the Connally Amendment. This
can only hurt the United States, as a country highly likely to go to court seeking
redress of grievances." GRIEVES, supra note 150, at 100.
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Statute is a most delicate task.153 Since the court's decisions are not
backed by any particular sovereign state or by any supernational ad-
ministrative agency, such as a world police force, and since the juris-
diction of the court is based in the first instance upon the consent of
the State's parties to the particular dispute before the court, the court
will not risk the disapproval which would result from all or most of
the States of the world if the court decided that it had substantive
jurisdiction over a matter which was clearly one of the domestic con-
cern of a State. The proper exercise of the court's power to deter-
mine its own jurisdiction in such a case would result in the court's
dismissal of the case on the basis that it was a domestic matter and
therefore not within the court's substantive jurisdiction. Also the
court would not risk the embarrassment and resulting diminution of
whatever respect the States do have for it by deciding such a case on
the merits and then having its decision ignored by the State in ques-
tion. Although the court's decisions are legally binding upon the
States which have accepted its jurisdiction, only by earning the re-
spect and confidence of the states as to its fairness and competence,
the latter of which includes the concept of judicial restraint, will the
court develop into a body of considerable effect in the maintenance
of world peace and public order. Unlike the United States Supreme
Court, which some writers assert has been too active in certain
areas,'" the International Court of Justice has a rather bare docket
at the present time.' 55
SUBSTANTIVE JURISDICTION
The various bases of substantive jurisdiction are found in the Stat-
ute of the court. There are two main classifications: advisory and
contentious jurisdiction.
The advisory jurisdiction of the court is based upon Article 65(1)
of the Statute: "The Court may give an advisory opinion on any
legal question at the request of whatever body may be authorized by
or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such
153. Supra note 131, at 304.
154. See, e.g., Bums, Mapp v. Ohio: An All American Mistake, 19 DE PAUL
L. REV. 80 (1969).
155. The last decision handed down by the Court was the Barcelona Traction
Case (Belgium v. Spain) of Feb. 5, 1970. The text of the decision can be found in
9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 227 (1970).
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a request." Also relevant is Article 68 of the Statute: "In the exer-
cise of its advisory functions the Court shall further be guided by the
provisions of the present Statute which apply in contentious cases to
the extent to which it recognizes them to be applicable."
Generally the court should not refuse to give an advisory opin-
ion,1"6 but under the power it has in Article 36(6) it may do so. Al-
though only States may be parties in contentious cases, the United
Nations Charter authorizes the General Assembly and the Security
Council to request advisory opinions, for example: Article 96(1) of
the Charter provides "The General Assembly or the Security Council
may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory
opinion on any legal question."
Also, the General Assembly may, under Article 96(2) of the
Charter, itself authorize certain agencies to request advisory opinions:
"Other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies, which
may at any time be so authorized by the General Assembly, may also
request advisory opinions of the Court on legal questions arising
within the scope of their activities."' 57
Use of the court's advisory jurisdiction by agencies which have
been so authorized and which are concerned with activities either in
or related to outer space may be well-advised where there are poten-
tial disputes which either cannot or should not be handled in mu-
nicipal courts of the states involved. Corporations and international
organizations which are not connected with the United Nations but
156. The foundation that a presumption exists to the effect that a request for
an advisory opinion should not in principle be refused was well established in
the Peace Treaties Case, I.C.J. REP. 65, 71 (1950). SHIHATA, supra note 131, at 123.
157. Organizations which have been authorized under this provision to ask the
court for advisory opinions are the Economic and Social Council, Trusteeship
Council, Interim Committee of the General Assembly, International Labor Organ-
ization, Food and Agricultural Organiaztion, Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization, International Civil Aviation Organization, International Monetary
Fund, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, World Health Or-
ganization, International Telecommunication Union, World Meteorological Organiza-
tion, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, International Atomic
Energy Agency, and the Committee on Applications for Review of Administrative
Tribunal Judgments. HARVEY, Work Paper Summary on Existing and Proposed
International Courts, WORLD PEACE THROUGH LAW-THE WASHINGTON WORLD CON-
FERENCE 119, 123 (1967). The following organizations of the above either are or
should be, due to the nature of their activities, closely involved with the exploration
and use of outer space: I .T.U., W.M.O., I.A.E.A., and the I.C.A.O.
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which engage in activities related directly to outer space should be
permitted to ask the court for advisory opinions, also.
1 58
The jurisdiction of the court over contentious cases can, as stated
earlier, be invoked only by states. In examining the types of con-
tentious jurisdiction the court may have, probably the best break-
down and classification is provided by Shihata's study.159 Shihata
describes two main types: original (or primary), and incidental.
Original jurisdiction is based upon the consent of the parties involved
in the dispute. It can be conferred in relation to one specific case
(ad hoc), or it can be conferred in relation to cases arising in the
future, in which instance there may be time or subject matter limita-
tions imposed by the states in question.
There are two and possibly three methods of invoking the court's
original jurisdiction for one specific case. The first method is for
the states involved in the dispute to enter into a prior agreement by
which they submit the case to the court. Such a prior agreement is
called a compromis and is based upon part of Article 36(1) of the
Statute: "The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the
parties refer to it . . . ." The second method is through the prin-
ciple of forum prorogatum, under which the court may not have ju-
risdiction at the start of the proceedings but acquires it during the
initial proceedings. 16 A third possible method is the conferring of
jurisdiction on the court by a resolution of the Security Council re-
questing the parties to refer the case to the court. Whether this
method can validly confer jurisdiction on the court against the wishes
of the party or parties is in dispute, 6' but if the Security Council has
this power it would be based upon the following provisions: Article
158. But see, I.C.J. STAT., art. 34, para. 2 which provides that: "(t)he Court,
subject to and in conformity with its Rules, may request of public international
organizations information relevant to cases before it, and shall receive such in-
formation presented by such organizations on their own initiative." Use of this
article is one possible example of what has been referred to as the recommendatory
function. See McDOUGAL, LASSWELL & VLASIC, supra note 8, at 122-24.
159. See supra note 131, at 125-80.
160. For a detailed discussion of the principle of forum prorogatum see supra
note 131, at 128-35; and 1 ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COURT 344-63 (1965).
161. See supra note 131, at 135-39. It should be remembered that in order for a
state to be subject to the jurisdiction of the court, the state must have consented to
be bound by the court's decision either prior to or during the proceedings. It is for
this reason that the term "compulsory" jurisdiction is imprecise.
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36(3) of the Charter states that "[iln making recommendations
under this article the Security Council should also take into consid-
eration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the
parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the
provisions of the Statute of the Court." And Article 36(1) of the
Statute provides: "The jurisdiction of the Court comprises . . . all
matters specifically provided for in the Charter of the United Nations.
"162
Original jurisdiction conferred in relation to cases arising in the
future can be based upon either a treaty or mutual declaration of
acceptance. Jurisdiction based on treaties is provided for in Article
36(1) of the Statute: "The jurisdiction of the Court comprises . . .
all matters provided for . . . in treaties and conventions in force."
If a treaty which is currently in force and which was entered into
during the period of the Permanent Court of International Justice
refers matters to that court or to a tribunal which was to have been
created by the League of Nations, the matter will now be referred to
the present court if the treaty is between states who are parties to the
present Statute of the court. 6 ' Mutual declarations of acceptance, of
which the United States declaration discussed earlier is one exam-
ple, 64 are based upon Article 36(2) of the Statute, often called the
"Optional Clause":
The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize
as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other
state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes
concerning:
(a) the interpretation of a treaty;
(b) any question of international law;
(c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of
an international obligation;
(d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an in-
ternational obligation.
Article 36(3) states that "the declarations . . . may be made un-
conditionally or on condition of reciprocity on the part of . . .
(other) States, or for a certain time." Many states have accepted
the jurisdiction of the court under the "Optional Clause," but all but
162. Supra note 131, at 135.
163. I.C.J. STAT. art. 37.
164. Declaration on the Part of the United States of America, done Aug. 14,
1946, 61 Stat. 1218, T.I.A.S. No. 1598, 1 U.N.T.S. 9.
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four have attached various conditions to their acceptance. 1 5 As
with treaties under Article 37 of the Statute, declarations made under
the Statute of the Permanent Court and which are still in force shall
be considered between the parties to be acceptances of the jurisdic-
tion of the present court for the period which they still have to run
and subject to all terms contained in the declaration, provided that
the States involved in the dispute are members of the United Na-
tions.16 6
The second main type of contentious jurisdiction is incidental ju-
risdiction, which is not based upon the consent of the parties but
upon the Statute or Rules of court or the fact that the court already
has primary or original jurisdiction over the case. Incidental juris-
diction may be exercised either before or apart from the court's de-
termination that it has substantive jurisdiction, or after the court's
determination as to such. In the former category there are two sub-
classifications. The first is jurisdiction to indicate interim measures
of protection, which is similar in function to the power of a munici-
pal court in common law systems to decree a temporary restraining
order or a preliminary injunction, i.e., Article 41(1) of the Statute
provides: "[t]he Court shall have the power to indicate, if it con-
siders that circumstances so require, any provisional measures which
ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party."'67
The second type is jurisdiction to allow third-party intervention.
This is based upon Article 62 of the Statute: "(1) Should a state
consider that it has an interest of a legal nature which may be af-
fected by the decision in the case, it may submit a request to the
Court to be permitted to intervene. (2) It shall be for the Court
to decide upon this request."
Article 63 of the Statute provides that notice is to be given to
States which are parties to a treaty which is the subject of a dispute
before the court when those States are not involved at that time in the
dispute. Each State so notified has the right to intervene in the case
165. See supra notes 137, 138 and accompanying text.
166. I.C.J. STAT. art. 36, para. 5.
167. See also RULES OF THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE,
art. 61.
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as under Article 62, but if it does so intervene it will be bound by the
court's decision as to the interpretation of the treaty.'""
In the latter category, where the court must first have made a de-
termination that it has substantive jurisdiction over a case, there is
then jurisdiction to interpret or revise a judgment and jurisdiction
to decide on counterclaims. Jurisdiction to interpret or revise a
judgment is given in Articles 60 and 61 of the Statute:
The (Court's) judgment is final and without appeal. In the event of dispute as
to the meaning or scope of the judgment, the Court shall construe it upon request
of any party. [and]
(1) An application for revision of a judgment may be made only when it is
based upon the discovery of some fact of such a nature as to be a decisive factor,
which fact was, when the judgment was given, unknown to the Court and also to
the party claiming revision, always provided that such ignorance was not due to neg-
ligence.
(2) The proceedings for a revision shall be opened by a judgment of the Court
expressly recording the existence of the new fact, recognizing that it has such a char-
acter as to lay the case open to revision, and declaring the application admissible
on this ground.
And the basis for hearing counterclaims is found in Article 63 of the
Rules of Court as follows:
When proceedings have been instituted by means of an application, a counter-claim
may be presented in the submissions of the Counter-Memorial, provided that such
counter-claim is directly connected with the subject-matter of the application and
that it comes within the jurisdiction of the Court. In the event of doubt as to
the connection between the question presented by way of counter-claim and the sub-
ject-matter of the application the Court shall, after due examination, direct whether
or not the question thus presented shall be joined to the original proceedings.
The purpose of the incidental contentious jurisdiction of the court
is to provide the court with certain incidents of jurisdiction enabling
it to provide all parties involved with the fairest possible treatment.
No attempt has been made in the foregoing examination of the
court's substantive jurisdiction to analyze critically the articles of
the court's Statute and Rules upon which it is based and to point out
weaknesses, ambiguities, etc. The sole purpose has been to present
the more important aspects of the court in order that a basis may be
established for understanding the court and its potential as a means
for the resolution of disputes arising in the opening realm of outer
space. The fact that the court has such incidents of jurisdiction
168. Further elaboration of the intervention procedure is provided by Id. art. 64,
65, and 66.
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available to it is to its credit. Any deficiencies can always be cor-
rected by amendment of the Statute or Rules of the court.
SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE COURT TO APPLY
IN SPACE CASES
After the court has found that it has original substantive jurisdic-
tion over a case it will hear the arguments of the parties and examine
the evidence relating to the merits of the case. 6"  It will then render
a decision based upon its findings. The sources of the law which the
court is to apply to a case are enumerated in Article 38(1) of the
Statute:
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings
of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means
for the determination of rules of law. 170
Treaties are agreements between two or more States. They may
or may not create rules of international law. Non-lawmaking treaties
merely provide for assistance and cooperation between States relating
to various areas of common interest. Most of the bilateral treaties
which the United States has entered into with other States providing
for satellite tracking stations fall into this category. Lawmaking
treaties create rules of international law binding upon the States par-
ties to the treaties. Such treaties may clarify what is considered by
the States to be a present rule of international law, create a new rule
or rules for governing the future activities of States, such as was done
in the 1967 and 1968 Space Treaties, or create a new international
institution, such as the International Court of Justice, or organization,
such as INTELSAT, in which case the rules for the operation of the
new institution or organization are specified in the same or a subse-
169. A challenge made by one of the parties to the substantive jurisdiction of the
court is called a preliminary objection, which the court will have to decide before it
can hear the merits of the case, unless the merits are tied to the preliminary objec-
tion, in which case both will be heard. See Id. art. 62.
170. I.C.J. STAT. art. 59 reads: "The decision of the Court has no binding force
except between the parties and in respect of that particular case."
1971] 671
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
quent and related treaty. All of these types of lawmaking treaties
are binding, of course, only upon the States parties to the treaties,
although a rule created by a treaty may become so widely adopted
and followed by such a large number of States not parties to the
original treaty that the rule will become part of international custom.
Treaties may, as discussed earlier, also be used as bases of jurisdiction
for the International Court of Justice as provided in Article 36(1)
of the Statute.
International custom is the second source of law the court could
apply, if relevant, to a case before it. To be considered as custom
a rule need not be recognized and followed by all States, but only by
most States. To put it differently, the test of international custom
is whether the rule in question has general recognition by States.171
Although no one State can create by unilateral action a rule of cus-
tomary international law, a State may promulgate a rule, not bind-
ing at the time outside of its own territory or upon aliens, which
eventually becomes accepted and followed by the majority of States
as a customary rule of international law. 17 2 Customary rules of law
may be put into treaty form, as was done with respect to certain rules
relating to the high seas.'17
Not very much international custom has developed with regard to
the activities of states and individuals in outer space due to the fact
that time and repeated practice are usually very important elements
in the development of customary international law.174 It is generally
believed, however, by most publicists that customary international
law has developed during the fourteen or so years since Sputnik
with regard to State claims of sovereignty in outer space. 17 5 Since
the first satellite was sent up in 1957 there have been no complaints
from any States that orbiting space vehicles have violated their terri-
torial airspace. Statements and actions by leaders of States have
supported this view so that it is now possible to say that however far
171. See BRIERLY, supra note 56, at 61.
172. See, e.g., The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170 (1872).
173. See BRIERLY, supra note 56, at 309.
174. But see Bin Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: "Instant"
International Customary Law?, 5 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 23 (1965), for a discussion of
the concept of "instant" custom.
175. See McDOUGAL, LASSWELL & VLASIC, supra note 8, at 217 and ch. 3 gen-
erally; BRIERLY, supra note 56, at 220; and supra note 37, at 351.
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up territorial sovereignty extends into the airspace superjacent to a
State, a question which has not yet been decided, it ends somewhere
before the height of the lowest possible perigee of manned or un-
manned spacecraft in durable Earth orbit." 6  It must be pointed
out, however, that, although States do not consider that space ve-
hicles orbiting Earth encroach upon their territorial sovereignty, some
States, most notably the Soviet Union, regard spy satellites as detri-
mental to their national security interests and have made statements
in the past to the effect that such spy satellites, even while beyond the
territorial jurisdiction of States, are subject to being shot down by the
State upon which they are spying. 177
No other customary international law may be said to have devel-
oped in outer space, although arguments have been advanced other-
wise. 17  It has also been argued that maritime custom may be ap-
plied to outer space through the simple analogy, that neither environ-
ment is subject to national claims of sovereignty. Professor Matte
points out the opposition to using such an analogy:
Air law and space law differ essentially from maritime law. They regulate methods
of locomotion dissimilar in their very technique, in their respective speed and
their object. Navigation through air and space experiences fast and constant prog-
ress which is no longer a feature of sea transportation. To set down premature
legal rules too strict and too rigid, could contribute to retarding the very evolution of
the science of aeronautics, astronautics, and several other connected sciences (tele-
communications, chemistry, etc.). . . . Therefore, it is indispensable to reject easy
analogies, such as that between the status of the sea or even of the Antarctic,
etc. 179
176. The height of the lowest possible perigee of manned or unmanned spacecraft
in durable Earth orbit is generally believed to be around 68-70 miles. Below that
altitude the density of the atmosphere increases causing a spacecraft to burn up as a
result of the heat generated from the friction between the spacecraft and the air
molecules. The exact demarcation line between airspace, which is subject to na-
tional sovereignty, and outer space, which is not, has not yet been determined. See
Vosburgh, Where Does Outer Space Begin?, 56 AM. B. ASs'N J. 134 (Feb. 1970).
177. See supra note 8.
178. See, e.g., Vlasic's statement on the 1963 Test Ban Treaty: "Even though
this treaty cannot technically bind the non-signatories, its well-nigh universal ac-
ceptance may before too long give it the force of international custom, thus making
conduct contrary to its stipulations a violation of international law." VLASIC, supra
note 21, at 172.
179. MAarE, supra note 12, at 44-45 (footnote omitted). The Antarctic
Treaty, while allowing the states parties to it to retain the territorial claims they
had at the time the treaty was entered into, allows no further territorial claims to
be made. See art. IV, Antarctic Treaty, done Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S.
No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
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In addition to differing from methods of transportation on the
high seas, travel in outer space is also quite different from flight in
the atmosphere due to the much increased speeds, the longer dura-
tion of the voyages, and the lack of the dominant presence of the
Earth's gravity.
The third source of international law the court can apply to a
case is the "general principles of law recognized by civilized na-
tions." This rather broad and flexible phrase is useful in that it al-
lows the court to use various principles of law of proven usefulness
in the rendering of just decisions. Such principles include res ju-
dicata, estoppel, good faith, and so on.1 0 The disposition on the
part of the framers of the United Nations Charter to make the court
responsive to ideas and principles from all the major legal systems
of this planet can be seen in Article 9 of the Statute which states that
the court as a whole should represent the "main forms of civilization
and. . . the principle legal systems of the world ..
A problem with this third source of international law, however,
is that the word "civilized" is a highly subjective term. Definitions
of the word will vary with one's social values, political allegiances,
and the like. Traditionally, "civilized" nations, as the term has been
used in international law, have been those whose values, ideologies,
social institutions, and the like have been Western European in na-
ture. This, of course, includes the United States, Canada, Australia,
etc. International law today is still largely governed by concepts
followed and developed by the Western European maritime nations
during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries to guide
them in their conquest and exploitation of almost all of the Western
and much of the Eastern Hemispheres. Probably the most impor-
tant of these concepts, and the one from which many subordinate
concepts originated, is the consensual, rather than the compulsory
nature of international law.
This same objection to the biased nature of general principles of
international law may be applied to customary international law:
"Customary international law is largely the product of value struc-
tures and state practices in an historic community of which the new,
180. BRIERLY, supra note 56, at 63. The Court may also decide a case ex
aequo et bono if the parties agree to such a determination. I.C.J. STAT. art. 38,
para. 2.
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underdeveloped nations and the socialist states of the East were not
a part."1 "
It is evident that if international law is to become a more effective
instrument for the achievement and maintenance of world peace it
will have to be more attentive to the voices and needs of those newer
and less developed countries in Central and South America, Africa,
and Asia which have not traditionally been a part of the development
of international law.
Despite this, however, it will be useful for the court to apply rele-
vant general principles of law to a case if to do so will enable the
court to reach a just decision. Matte, while arguing for the creation
of a new species of law applicable to outer space, recognizes the need
to rely upon some principles which are already developed:
Therefore, (the aerospace-maritime) analogy should be refused and a basic prin-
ciple asserted: that the legal status of the air and space must derive from a new
branch of the law which cannot be copied from any other law, while it must con-
form to certain principles of international law.182
The last two sources of international law are judicial decisions
and the writings of qualified publicists of international law. Judicial
decisions may be of the International Court of Justice, the Permanent
Court of International Justice, other international tribunals, and mu-
nicipal courts, although the first two are generally accorded more
weight.18 3 Although precedent is not binding in international law
as it is in common law or Anglo-Saxon legal systems, it will naturally
be used in international law as an aid to reading a decision in a case.
The importance of judicial decisions in international law was ex-
pressed by Chief Justice Marshall of the United States Supreme
Court:
The law of nations is the great source from which we derive those rules . . . which
are recognized by all civilized and commercial states throughout Europe and Amer-
ica. This law is in part unwritten, and in part conventional. To ascertain that
which is unwritten, we resort to the great principles of reason and justice: but, as
these principles will be differently understood by different nations under different
circumstances, we consider them as being, in some degree, fixed and rendered stable
by a series of judicial decisions. The decisions of the Courts of every country, so
far as they are founded upon a law common to every country, will be received not
as authority, but with respect. The decisions of the Courts of every country
181. -A VEY, supra note 157, at 121.
182. MATrE, supra note 12, at 54.
183. BRIERLY, supra note 56, at 64-65.
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show how the law of nations, in the given case, is understood in that country, and
will be considered in adopting the rule which is to prevail in this.l8 4
There have not as of yet been any cases on outer space.'8 5 This
is no doubt due to the fact that activities in outer space have been
conducted for only about fourteen years and have been relatively
speaking, of a limited nature. Although the international coopera-
tion between the two space giants has left much to be desired, there
have been no disputes (other than academic ones) between them.
This is probably due to the disposition of each to stay out of the
other's way. Nevertheless, as pointed out earlier, as activities be-
come more complex and as more States participate, either directly or
indirectly, in the exploration and use of outer space, there will be dis-
putes needing advisement or adjudication by an international court
controlled by no States or special interest groups and fair to all.
Sophisticated and near-perfect as space gadgetry becomes, human
beings will be ultimately behind their operation for some time to
come, and where there are human beings there will be conflicts
of interest. Such conflicts, in view of man's increasing ability to de-
stroy life as he knows it, will demand peaceful settlement.
The other subsidiary source of international law, the writings of
publicists, is less consequential than judicial decisions as a general
rule, but they serve as a good method of determining what the law
is or how it can be interpreted. Mr. Justice Gray, writing three
years before the Wright Brothers made history at Kitty Hawk, stated
a truism for international law in the Space Age:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by
courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending
upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose, where there
is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision,
resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence
of these, to the works of jurists and commentators, who by years of labor, research,
184. Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 197 (1815).
185. There have been court decisions, however, establishing precedent potentially
applicable to the law of outer space. An example is the recent decision of Burdell
v. Canadian Pacific Airlines, 10 Avi. 18,151 (1968), which declared, among other
things, that the provisions of the 1929 Warsaw Convention (49 Stat. 3000 (1934),
T.S. No. 876), limiting the liability of air carriers were unconstitutional. Although
a trial court decision and although the case was ultimately settled without trial, Bur-
dell is an indication of the dislike of American municipal courts for limited liability
and is thus a relevant concern for the future framers of a space liability convention,
which may contain a provision limiting damages to be awarded for personal injury
or property damage.
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and experience, have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects
of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for
the speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for
trustworthy evidence of what the law really is .... 186
In addition to describing "what the law really is," the writings of
publicists can be of great value as a source of new ideas which may
eventually be adopted by custom, court decision, or convention. In
this newest and most unexplored of man's adopted environments,
where Earthly precedent will many times prove to be of little or no
value due to unexpected situations and circumstances, the ideas of
qualified and wide-visioned publicists will be of great importance in
shaping international rules and policy.
These, then, are the sources of the law of outer space which the
International Court of Justice, other international tribunals, or mu-
nicipal courts can apply in the adjudication of a dispute arising in
outer space or on Earth but directly relating to outer space. The mu-
nicipal law of a State may, where relevant, also be applied. An
example of municipal law which could be used in a case involving
outer space is the Communications Satellite Act of 1962. The reso-
lutions of the United Nations, although not generally regarded as
creating rules of international law by themselves, may be reasonably
relied upon as definitive statements of international law if they are
tied to a traditional (Article 38) source of international law. This
may be done in one of several ways: the resolution may "interpret
the United Nations Charter or other treaty, accelerate the develop-
ment and clarify the scope of a customary rule, or identify and au-
thenticate a 'general principle of law recognized by civilized na-
tions.' 117
Once a case has been decided the decision is binding on the parties
to the case and only in respect of that particular case. 88  Also
bound, in the case of the interpretation of a treaty provision, are
those States who have intervened in the case under Article 62 of the
Statute. Each State which is a member of the United Nations is under
a duty to comply with any decision of the court in any case to which
186. The Paquete Habana; The Lola, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900), citing Hilton
v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
187. Bleicher, The Legal Significance of Re-Citation of General Assembly Reso-
lutions, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 444, 452 (July 1969).
188. I.C.J. STAT. art. 59.
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it is a party.' 89 This duty, of course, is based upon the court's find-
ing that the State first consented to the court's jurisdiction over the
case, although the State may have contested this in a preliminary
objection proceeding. If a party to a case fails to abide by the court's
decision, the other party or parties may bring the matter before the
Security Council, "which may, if it deems necessary, make recom-
mendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the
judgment."' 90
The means by which the Security Council or other organs of the
United Nations, or the winning States themselves may resort to in
order to compel the obedience to a court decision by a reluctant State
are beyond the scope of this discussion. Briefly, they are spread over
a spectrum which on one end includes such peaceful measures such
as United Nations censorship, condemnation or embargo by other
States, and similar things, to measures short of war but more hostile,
such as blockade, on the other. The ultimate measure, of course, is
war, but to go to war in order to enforce a decision of the court
seems to defeat the real purpose of the court-the establishment and
subsequent maintenance of minimum public order on the planet
Earth. War is Earth's most important problem (although pollution
and overpopulation rank closely behind it). Kelsen, during what
has, so far, been the worst war in the twentieth century, stated this
fact: "Hence the elimination of war is our paramount problem. It
is a problem of international policy, and the most important means
of international policy is international law."'' The rejection of war
as a means of settling disputes and the implementation of a greater
reliance upon the court or other international tribunal to resolve those
cases which for various reasons either cannot or should not be han-
dled by municipal courts remains as number one objective in inter-
national law today.
Considerable discussion was given earlier to the non-existence of
a world police force and the fact that this does not impair the legally-
binding character of the court's judgments. The fact that the States
have endeavored to set up international courts such as the Permanent
Court and the present court shows some degree of recognition that
189. U.N. CHARTER art. 94, para. 1.
190. U.N. CHARTER art. 94, para. 2.
191. Kelsen, supra note 51, at 398.
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our world is a highly interdependent one, due largely to the advances
of science and technology in such areas as transportation and com-
munications in the current century. This interdependency will only
increase, for the day of large and isolated societies such as the Inca
Empire and pre-twentieth century China are over forever. Human
behavior tends toward organization, for as Brierly states, "(t)he ulti-
mate explanation of the binding force of all law is that man, whether
he is a single individual or whether he is associated with other men
in a state, is constrained, in so far as he is a reasonable being, to
believe that order and not chaos is the governing principle of the
world in which he is to live. '
1 92
It is the premise of this paper that the Connally Amendment and
all other such adherences by all States which hold to the purely con-
sensual conception of international law will eventually have to give
way to a more ordered and peaceful political reality on Earth. In
such a reality the concept of an international court has a definite and
necessary place.
Before moving to the question of what the International Court of
Justice can do today in regard to space disputes, it is essential to
point out that resort to the court will in many cases be only a last,
and not a first step to the peaceful resolution of problems between
states and other international parties. There are other means of
peacefully solving international disputes, and to ignore them would
be myopic:
A focus on judicial institutions, though defensible for purposes of study, invites
distortion of perspective on the status and function of law in the internaitonal
community. . . . It takes no explicit account of the function of international law in
ordering conduct so as to avoid disputes or in setting operative norms for the
resolution of conflict through diplomacy, mediation or conciliation. Nor does it
encompass more flexible quasi-adjudicative techniques for settling disputes through
arbitral tribunals or mixed claims commissions.
193
The United Nations Charter as well recognizes the importance of
both judicial and non-judicial means of settling disputes:
(1) The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution
by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement,
resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own
choice.
192. BRIERLY, supra note 56, at 56.
193. HARVEY, supra note 157, at 119.
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(2) The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to
settle their dispute by such means. (Article 33).
The most important result in a dispute situation is that the dis-
pute, which may be of such importance to the parties that each of
them would risk hostile interaction with the other rather than forego
the protection of its interest in the matters at issue, be settled in a
manner which is neither disruptive of world peace nor endangering
of any future opportunities to achieve a more substantial peace, and
which, at the same time, is fair to the interests of all involved par-
ties. The purpose of this article is not to propose international judi-
cial machinery as the only means of settling disputes in outer space,
but as one which should be resorted to after other means have failed
and before and instead of the initiation of less peaceful means. Na-
tions, just as the individuals who populate them, will not always be
able to "settle" a case before trial.
THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE COURT IN RELATION TO
DISPUTES IN OUTER SPACE
At present, very little has been done to provide for the settlement
of disputes between States and/or international organizations con-
cerning events either in or directly related to outer space and where
municipal courts cannot or should not exercise jurisdiction. Treaties,
one of the sources of international law, can, as stated earlier, also be
used to confer jurisdiction on either the International Court of Jus-
tice or another designated tribunal. It is illustrative, although un-
fortunately so, of the inability of States to work together to create an
international reality where resort to the court or another competent
international tribunal to settle disputes which have not been settled
by other peaceful means is the general rule and not the exception,
as is the case today, that three of the most important treaties cur-
rently in force concerning outer space do not contain any provisions
for the settlement of disputes about their interpretation or application,
either by judicial or non-judicial methods. The 1963 Test Ban
Treaty, the 1967 Space Treaty, and the 1968 Astronaut Agreement
do not, in fact, even mention the word dispute or an appropriate
synonym anywhere in their provisions."9 4 The 1968 Non-Prolifer-
194. The United States had submitted a draft proposal providing recourse to the
International Court of Justice in the event of a dispute as to application or inter-
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ation Treaty also contains no reference to the settlement of disputes
arising in regard to its provisions.
Two treaties which do not relate directly to outer space, but which
because of their subject matter provide somewhat appropriate points
of discussion at this point, do contain dispute provisions:
Article XVII of the International Atomic Energy Agency Statute
states:
A. Any question or dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this
Statute which is not settled by negotiation 'shall be referred to the International
Court of Justice in conformity with the Statute of the Court, unless the parties
concerned agree on another mode of settlement.
B. The General Conference and the Board of Governors are separately em-
powered, subject to authorization from the General Assembly of the United Nations,
to request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any
legal question arising within the scope of the Agency's activities.1 9 5
The Antarctic Treaty provides in Article XI(1) that when two or
more of the States parties to the treaty disagree as to the interpreta-
tion or application of the treaty, they "shall consult among themselves
with a view to having the dispute resolved by negotiation, inquiry,
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other
peaceful means of their own choice." This language is nearly identi-
cal with that of Article 33(1) of the United Nations Charter, having
left out only "resort to regional agencies or arrangements." Para-
graph (2) provides that if such a dispute is not resolved by such
pretation of the provisions of the 1967 Space Treaty, but little effort was made by
either the United States or the Soviet Union to work out an acceptable provision
on dispute settlement due to past differences of opinion and the desire to expedite
agreement on the Space Treaty as a whole. See Dembling & Arons, The Evolution
of the Outer Space Treaty, 33 J. AIR L. & CoM. 419, 453 (1967).
The closest the 1967 Space Treaty comes to providing for the peaceful resolution
of disputes as to the application or interpretation of its provisions is in art. XIII,
where the second paragraph states that "(a)ny practical questions arising in connec-
tion with activities carried on by international inter-governmental organizations in
the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, shall be resolved by the States Parties to the Treaty either with the appropriate
international organization or with one or more States members of that international
organization, which are Parties to the Treaty."
195. The purpose of the International Atomic Energy Agency is stated in art. II
of the I.A.E.A. Statute, done Oct. 26, 1956, 8 U.S.T. 1093, T.I.A.S. No. 3873, 276
U.N.T.S. 3: "The (International Atomic Energy) Agency shall seek to accelerate
and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity
throughout the world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided
by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as
to further any military purpose."
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means as in paragraph (1), the dispute shall be referred to the In-
ternational Court of Justice. If the parties fail, however, to reach
an agreement (compromis) on referring the case to the court, they
shall not be absolved "from the responsibility of continuing to seek
to resolve it by any of the various peaceful means referred to in para-
graph 1 of this Article."19
The two regional multilateral space organizations in Europe also
provided some express means for the settlement of disputes arising
among their member States. Article XVI of the ESRO Convention
provides: "Any dispute concerning the interpretation or application
of this Convention, which is not settled by the good offices of the
Council, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice, un-
less the Member States concerned agree on some other mode of set-
lement." The ELDO Convention provision is more elaborate:
In the event of any dispute between two or more States, Members of the Organisation
or former Members, or between one or more of them and the Organisation,
concerning the interpretation or the application of this Convention, not being set-
tled by the good offices of the Council, an Arbitral Tribunal shall be set up at the
request of one of the parties, unless the parties agree on some other mode of
peaceful settlement. (Article 22(1)).
Paragraph (2) relates to the nationality composition of the Arbitral
Tribunal. If the States-parties to the dispute cannot agree as to who
shall be on the Tribunal, the President of the Court of Justice of the
European Communities shall make the appointments at the request
of any one of the parties."9 7 Paragraph (3) states that the decision
of the Tribunal shall be binding on the parties to the dispute. Since
ELDO existed partly to make vehicle launchers for ESRO and since
the two organizations differed in purpose and membership, it should
be realized that if any dispute had arisen involving States members
of both organizations and concerning both organizations it would
have posed a jurisdictional problem due to the different means pro-
vided for the settlement of disputes.'
196. Antarctic Treaty, art. XI, para. 2.
197. The Court of Justice of the European Communities is one of the "common
institutions" of the three European Communities: the European Atomic Energy
Community (EURATOM), the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC),
and the European Economic Community (EEC). The court derives its jurisdiction
from the three treaties which created these communities. Stein & Hay, supra note
96, at 133.
198. See generally Washburn, The Future of ELDO and ESRO in the Light of
[Vol. XX: 618
OUTER SPACE CONFLICTS
Since the most elaborate area of space law today is that involving
telecommunications, it is not surprising to find that the most elab-
orate procedure for dispute settlement is also found in that area.
Article 14 of the INTELSAT Special Agreement of August 20,
1964 provides:
Arrangements shall be made whereby all legal disputes arising in connection . . .
with the rights and obligations of signatories can, if not otherwise settled, be sub-
mitted to the decision of an impartial tribunal, to be established in accordance
with such arrangements, which would decide such questions in accordance with
general principles of law ...
Pursuant to this the INTELSAT Supplementary Agreement on Ar-
bitration"9' was opened for signature on June 4, 1965, binding on
all those states who were or would become parties to the Special
Agreement. Under the Supplementary Agreement on Arbitration
procedures were established whereby a panel of individual legal ex-
perts, representing the principle legal systems among the signatories,
would be appointed from which the presidents of the arbitral tri-
bunals were to be selected if a dispute arose.2"' The tribunals were
to each consist of the president and two other members, the latter
two being chosen by the petitioner and the respondent states respec-
tively.2 '
Article 2(a) of the Supplementary Agreement defines the juris-
diction of a tribunal created under the Supplementary Agreement.
Such a tribunal is competent to decide any legal dispute as to
"whether an action or a failure to act by the (Interim Communica-
tions Satellite) Committee or by any signatory or signatories is au-
thorized by or is in compliance with the (INTELSAT) Agreement
and the Special Agreement." Paragraph (b) further defines the ju-
risdiction of the tribunal by giving it competence to decide any legal
dispute involving "any other agreement relating to the arrangements
established by the Agreement and the Special Agreement where the
signatories which are parties to that other agreement have agreed to
confer such a competence." In such a case the tribunal must abide
Current Negotiations of Definitive Arrangements for Intelsat, 4 INT'L LAWYER 288
(1970).
199. The text of the Supplementary Agreement can be found in 4 Ilrr'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 735 (1965).
200. Supplementary Agreement on Arbitration, art. 3 opened for signature
June 4, 1965, - Stat. -, T.I.A.S. No. -.
201. Id. articles 4(d), 4(a)(v), and 4(b).
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by the other agreement in deciding the case. And paragraph (c) de-
fines standing in such arbitration proceedings and limits it to signa-
tories and the Interim Communications Satellite Committee.
An arbitral tribunal created under this Supplementary Agreement
has the competence to decide whether it has jurisdiction over a mat-
ter submitted to it under the provisions of the Supplementary Agree-
ment. Article 5(f) provides: "At any time during the proceedings,
the tribunal may terminate the proceedings if it decides the dispute
is beyond its jurisdiction as defined in Article 2 of this Supplementary
Agreement." Also Article 5(e) provides that "[t]he tribunal may
hear and determine counterclaims arising directly out of the subject
matter of the dispute provided the counterclaims are within its juris-
diction as defined in Article 2 of this Supplementary Agreement."
And later in Article 6(a): "If one side fails to present its case, the
other side may call upon the tribunal to accept its case and to give a
decision in its favor. Before doing so, the tribunal shall satisfy itself
that it has jurisdiction and that the case is well founded in fact and
law." These sections leave no doubt that an arbitral tribunal created
to resolve disputes between members of INTELSAT has the com-
petence to decide whether it has jurisdiction over the dispute, and
that the States involved do not determine this fact for themselves, as
the Connally Amendment purports to state that the United States
decides for itself whether the International Court of Justice has juris-
diction over a dispute to which the United States is a party.
Finally, with respect to the Supplementary Agreement on Arbitra-
tion, a tribunal has an advisory function with respect to each case.
"During the course of its consideration of the case, the tribunal shall
have power, pending the final decision, to make recommendations
to the parties with a view to the protection of their respective rights."
(Article 10). This differs from the advisory power of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, however, in that the tribunal will exercise the
power described in Article 10 as part of its determination of a con-
tentious case, whereas the International Court of Justice can exer-
cise its advisory power separately and apart from a contentious case,
so long as it has jurisdiction over the case.
If the parties reach an agreement during the proceedings of the
tribunal, the agreement shall be recorded in the form of a decision
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of the tribunal given by the consent of the parties. 2 The decision
is binding on all States parties to the dispute, as is the case with the
International Court of Justice, unless the tribunal has declared a de-
cision of the Committee null and void because it was not in compli-
ance with the Agreement or the Special Agreement, in which case the
decision of the tribunal is binding on all States parties to the
INTELSAT Agreement.20 3  This latter power, of course, goes far
beyond any power the International Court of Justice has, as the court
can bind by its decisions only those states which are parties to the
case before it, and not United Nation members as a whole.
These then are the instances in which the principle treaties cur-
rently in force dealing with the subject of outer space, either totally
or partially, have provided for the settlement of disputes concerning
the application or interpretation of their provisions. In addition to
the above, States may submit disputes on outer space to the Inter-
national Court of Justice on an ad hoc basis by compromis, as de-
scribed earlier, or the court may find on the-application of one of the
parties to the dispute that the other party or parties have submitted
such cases to it under a prior mutual declaration of acceptance made
under the "Optional Clause." Neither of these methods, however,
is assured of much success in insuring that the court will have juris-
diction over future space disputes, as the former method suffers from
the general reluctance of states to refer cases to the court, and the
latter method has been diluted in effectiveness by reservations such
as the Connally Amendment, although such reservations to the court's
jurisdiction can be argued as being invalid.20 4
202. Id. art. 11(b).
203. Id. art. 11(c).
204. Shihata lists four theories on the effect of reservation clauses:
1. The clause is null and void in itself and, since it cannot be separated from
the instrument containing it, nullifies the instrument as a whole;
2. The clause is void while the rest of the instrument remains valid. Under
this view the International Court of Justice can have jurisdiction over the case;
3. The reservation is valid, but the Court still retains its competence de la
competence (jurisdiction to decide if it has substantive jurisdiction.) The Court
will interpret the reservation in good faith according to one of the following criteria
in each particular case:
A. (objective) the invocation of the reservation will be in good faith only if the
court finds that the question involved falls within the domestic jurisdiction of the
reserving party according to international law;
B. (subjective) the invocation of the reservation will be in good faith only if
the question has been traditionally considered by the reserving state as a matter
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The present international political and legal reality offers little
hope, therefore, that the International Court of Justice or another
international tribunal will be largely instrumental in the orderly de-
velopment of the outer space environment. This is unfortunate and
must be corrected, as scientific and technological developments along
with increased interaction among States and their peoples will give
rise to problems best resolved, if non-judicial means of settlement
fail, in an appropriate international court. One such problem which
will no doubt be typical of future problems both on Earth and in
outer space is the recent series of claims by Canada to jurisdiction
over the Northwest Passage.
Newly-discovered oil fields in Alaska and the probability of super-
tankers such as the Manhattan making regular runs to the oil fields
via the Arctic Ocean along the shores of Canada's Northwest Terri-
tories have caused concern among Canadians that the delicate eco-
logical system of the Arctic areas may be irreparably harmed due to
pollution from the tankers, especially if a tanker has an accident which
would cause the release of huge quantities of oil into the Arctic en-
vironment. Since oil does not break up or evaporate in the Arctic
and may lie in an almost solid state on the ice or tundra for genera-
tions, the Canadians have good reason to become alarmed. Due to
the fact that there exists no international law to give coastal states
adequate protection against pollution, Canada has taken three steps,
best described as interim measures, to protect the Arctic environ-
ment against pollution from tankers operating along the Canadian
coast but more than three miles off the coast and therefore on the
high seas: (1) Canada has extended its claim to territorial waters
from the present three-mile limit to a twelve-mile limit beyond its
coasts; (2) it has assumed the right to enforce safety regulations on
all shipping within 100 miles from its coast; and (3) it has notified
the United Nations that it no longer recognizes the jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice in disputes over pollution control and
damage off its coastline. 20 5
within its domestic jurisdiction;
4. The acceptance of jurisdiction by the Court is in all cases subject to the
reservation. Supra note 131, at 284-94.
205. Christian Science Monitor, April 16, 1970, at 3, col. 1. The text of the
Canadian legislation implementing these three steps can be found in 9 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 543, 553, 598 (1970).
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Official American reaction, of course, rejects the Canadian claim
to enforce safety regulations for a hundred miles beyond its coast,
and while it is highly unlikely that both nations would engage in any
type of hostility over such a dispute, this is precisely the type of mat-
ter which will occur with increasing regularity not only on Earth but
in outer space as man's technology allows him to use and exploit in-
creasingly larger portions of the universe in which he lives. The
legal and jurisdictional vacuum created by onrushing science and
technology constitutes potential work for the International Court of
Justice. The States must somehow overcome their restrictive adher-
ences to what they erroneously consider national and "domestic"
problems: such problems are truly international in scope and effect.
Canada has stated that it is ready and willing to begin not only bi-
lateral, but worldwide negotiations on an international law curbing
pollution of all seas.206 Such a worldwide convention, however,
would take time to organize and even more time to establish a
meaningful and effective set of regulations. In the meantime the
Canadian-American situation may not wait, and, in absence of a non-
judicial settlement, submission of the dispute to the International
Court of Justice for a determination of the rights and duties under
international law of both parties would be a mature and realistic
way of settling the matter:
(T)he World Court sits with hardly any business. Meanwhile the world is full of
jealousies, rivalries, and wars. It is like a frontier community where men take
justice into their own hands because the rule of law is powerless. A frank appeal
now by the US to put the Arctic claims matter to the World Court for arbitration
without appeal would be a token not merely of goodwill to a splendid neighbor,
but it would be a gesture of decency for civilization, at a time when nobody knows
for sure whether it can survive.207
The future activities of humans to explore and exploit outer space
will undoubtedly bring an increase in the number of such impor-
tant international legal problems.
206. Christian Science Monitor, April 27, 1970, at 11, col. 4. Statements by
both governments concerning the whole Arctic question can be found in 9 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 600, 605, 607 (1970).
207. Editorial by Richard L. Strout, Christian Science Monitor, April 24, 1970,
at 20, col. 3. The whole problem of the Canadian claims as well as those aspects
which relate to the International Court of Justice are discussed in Bilder, The
Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act: New Stresses on the Law of
the Sea, 69 MIcH. L. REV. 1 (1970).
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As the present situation will no doubt be inadequate for the resolu-
tion of these problems, it is essential that some changes and amend-
ments be made to the current status of the International Court of Jus-
tice. Such changes and amendments must of necessity begin with
the proposal of new ideas. Any proposals, however, relating to the
improvement of both international law in general and the Interna-
tional Court of Justice in particular and with an eye toward the evo-
lution of a more rational world reality, where the minimization of
the use of force is both an accepted and practiced goal, are subject to
either of two main criticisms, usually from two widely differing
schools of international political thought: (1) The first criticizes
the proposals as being too much attached to present world political
reality and dedicated to concepts of arguable value (such as the
Connally Amendment) to the solution of present and future prob-
lems to be of any constructive use; or (2) the second criticizes the
proposals as being too idealistic and far-removed from present inter-
national reality to be of any constructive use.
While both of these points of view contain some validity, it should
be obvious to the serious student and scholar of international law
that the only truly non-constructive attitude is a rigid adherence to
either viewpoint. The proposals to follow are intended only as start-
ing points for further discussion, deliberation, and research, and not
as conclusive answers to the many vague and undefined problems to
be brought about by human activities in outer space.
PROPOSALS
The following pattern should be established:
(A) All disputes arising either in outer space or on Earth (includ-
ing within the Earth's atmosphere) which directly relate to outer
space and which involve questions of international law lie within the
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, except
as otherwise modified in (B) and (E) below.
The establishment of this general rule would, of course, be the
reverse of the present situation, where the jurisdiction of the court
is only the limited exception to the general rule of State jurisdiction.
It would be a radical departure from the status quo of international
law today.
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It is possible to envision such an arrangement, as well as that pro-
posed in (E) below, as being established under a form of trusteeship
agreement. It is not at all advisable, however, to rely upon the tradi-
tional form of trusteeship arrangement that has evolved in the United
Nations.2 0 If, however, a modified concept of the trusteeship sys-
tem is adopted, so that the emphasis is not upon assisting former
colonies and present underdeveloped nations to achieve independ-
ence,20 9 but to peacefully resolve disputes between states which have
not been resolved by other peaceful means, then the trusteeship con-
cept can serve a new and useful purpose in outer space. The trustee-
ship would, of course, be administered by either the United Na-
tions or a new international organzitaion. (See Proposal [E] below).
(B) Disputes which concern matters exclusively within the domes-
tic jurisdiction of a single state according to international law do not
lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice. Such matters will be handled exclusively by the municipal
courts or other institutions of the state in question.
It can reasonably be expected that for some time many spacecraft
will have the nationality of a single State, namely, the State on whose
registry the spacecraft is carried, and that such spacecraft will re-
main subject to the jurisdiction and control of that State, as is cur-
rently provided in Article VIII of the 1967 Space Treaty. Spacecraft
will thus be considered extensions of the territorial jurisdiction of the
state of registry. Many of the situations occurring on board space-
craft and requiring some type of judicial resolution will be subject
to the jurisdiction of either the state of registry or other States having
some connection with the event and will not be subject to the juris-
diction of the International Court of Justice.210 This would not, of
208. The United Nations trusteeship system (see U.N. CHARTER art. 75-91) is,
in part, an extension of the mandate system established by art. 22 of the League of
Nations Covenant, which itself was mainly intended as a solution to the problem
of the disposition of former enemy (Axis) colonies from World War I. Although
trusteeships have greater flexibility and broader scope, their traditional use on Earth
leaves little which can be applied directly to the objective of establishing com-
pulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in outer space.
209. The major objectives of the trusteeship system were to promote the political,
economic, social, and educational well-being of the non-self-governing territories and
to encourage their development toward self-government or independence. See Male-
cela, The United Nations and the Decolonization of Non-Self-Governing Territories,
UN MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Vol. IV, No. 8, 84-85 (1967).
210. Possible examples are disputes arising from contracts, marriages, births,
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course, conflict with the now accepted customary rule of international
law prohibiting sovereign claims over any part of outer space or
over natural celestial bodies. 1'
(C) If a dispute arises between two or more States as to whether
a matter is exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of any one of
the States involved in the dispute, the International Court of Justice
will decide whether the matter is exclusively within the domestic juris-
diction of any one of the States.
One example of such a situation would be where States A, B, and
C disagree as to whether a crime which was committed on board a
spacecraft carried on State A's registry, which involved nationals of
State B, and which produced effects in State C was exclusively within
the domestic jurisdiction of any one of the States. Each State would
have a valid claim to jurisdiction over the matter based upon one or
more of the theories of international criminal jurisdiction discussed
earlier (assuming that the act was defined as a crime in all three
states). The question of whether any one of the States is entitled
to have exclusive jurisdiction over the matter and the individuals in-
volved because the matter is exclusively within the State's domestic
jurisdiction is one of international law for the International Court of
Justice to decide.212
(D) If the International Court of Justice finds that the matter is not
exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of any one of the States
involved in the dispute, it will then have compulsory jurisdiction over
the matter itself.
(E) An international agency or organization should be created
which would be given primary jurisdiction over certain matters which
by their very nature demand summary measures. Appeal of the de-
cisions of the agency could then be had to the International Court of
deaths by natural causes, divorces, will contests, inter vivos gifts and other such
interactions which either are not disruptive or cannot reasonably be expected to be
disruptive of peaceful relations between states.
211. But see MATrE, supra note 12, at 311-12, who suggests that the two prin-
ciples are inconsistent.
212. States could, of course, provide through treaty that certain theories of
jurisdiction could not be used. An example of the use of such a device can be
found in art. 11 of the 1958 High Seas Treaty, which allows only the territorial
and active personality principles to be used in collisions and other specified situa-
tions. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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Justice for review, with the agency's decision remaining intact and
binding until final decision by the court. In all other disputes not
expressly within the primary jurisdiction of the designated agency the
International Court of Justice would have compulsory jurisdiction as
stated in Proposal (A).
Although it would be desirable to put all space activities under the
jurisdiction and control of an international space organization which
would coordinate and direct the efforts and activities of men and
states in outer space, with various agencies directing specific areas
of concern, and thereby prevent the waste of human and other re-
sources in unnecessary and duplicate efforts by rival states as is cur-
rently the case, the existing international reality precludes such a
scheme, at least for the foreseeable future. What can be done pres-
ently, however, is to give a designated international agency or organi-
zation jurisdiction to regulate, at least a particular area in need, in
order that States and international organizations, such as ELDO and
ESRO, which are involved in space activities do not interfere with
and disrupt each other's efforts. As telecommunications is the area
of space science and technology of most practical and beneficial use
at the present time, and since it is essential to all other areas of space
activity, it would be most logical to begin there.
For example, the International Frequency Registration Board, the
organ of the International Telecommunication Union which keeps
the registry of assigned frequencies and records harmful interfer-
ences, currently has no power to enforce the regulations in case of a
violation. It should be given power by multilateral international
agreement so that it will be able to prevent or remedy any harmful
interferences.213 This power would be similar in result to the in-
213. The ideas that the ITU should be given sufficient power to remedy harmful
radio interference, and that an international court would be too slow in acting to
initially handle such a matter have been advanced before: "At a time when man is
reaching the moon, the dangers caused by harmful (radio) interference may be
more destructive than previously, because of the increased importance of telecom-
munications during interplanetary journeys. The need to arrive at a new method
of international control of wave lengths, by an organization able to make speedy
decisions, is urgent: as, any tribunal or international court would be obsolete and
superfluous on account of the rapid decisions which must be taken in similar cir-
cumstances, particularly as the limited number of frequency bands obliges humanity
to choose the best means of using them peacefully and in the general interest."
MATTE, supra note 12, at 120.
Vlasic suggests "strengthening the ITU's decision-making authority and ... ex-
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junctive power of common law municipal courts. After the activities
causing the interference have ceased due to the IFRB's summary or-
der, the whole matter could be reviewed by the International Court
of Justice.
As other areas of outer space activity become more important they
too could, with the agreement of the States involved, be put under the
jurisdiction and direction of an international organization or agency.
Mining and manufacturing operations on the moon, not currently
feasible economically, may one day be conducted under such a
scheme. Appeal of the decisions of any regulatory agency, of
course, would be available to the International Court of Justice or
another international judicial body.2 14 Eventually, it is hoped, all
activities of men and States of the planet Earth will be directed by an
"Earth Space Organization" for the benefit of all humans, with par-
ticular areas (telecommunications, weather forecasting, mining and
manufacturing, etc.) probably being administered by different agen-
cies within the organization.215
Next the Connally Amendment and all other reservations to mu-
tual declarations of acceptance of the court's jurisdiction should be
repealed by the States which enacted them.
Although any multilateral treaty by which States agree to submit
all or certain types of disputes to the International Court of Justice
would not be affected by Connally-type reservations, due to the fact
that such reservations refer only to acceptances of the court's juris-
tending the powers of the IFRB to include the enforcement of the frequency assign-
ments." VLASIC, supra note 21, at 175. See also Glazer, The Law-Making Treaties
of the International Telecommunication Union Through Time and Space, 60 MicH.
L. REV. 269, 309-15 (1962).
214. One of the functions of the Court of Justice of the European Communi-
ties (see supra note 215) is to review the administrative acts of the various institu-
tions of the Communities. STEIN & HAY, supra note 96, at 133, 134.
215. It is impossible at the present time to predict with any degree of accuracy
the precise form that such an "Earth Space Organization" should take, due to the
fact that so little is known about the space environment and even less about how
human activities and interactions will be affected by it. It can reasonably be
suggested, however, that one study the proposals relating to the control of the inter-
national seabed area in order to derive some idea about how the questions of re-
sources, etc. be best handled in outer space. The seabed (that area of the ocean floor
beyond territorial boundaries) is in many ways analogous to planetary surfaces and
perhaps even space itself. See text of the United States Draft of the United Nations
Convention on the International Seabed Area. 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1046
(1970).
692 [Vol. XX: 618
OUTER SPACE CONFLICTS
diction made under Article 36(2) of the Statute (whereas a treaty
provision which invokes the court's jurisdiction would be made under
Article 36(1) of the Statute),216 the existence of such reservations
could interfere with the submission to the court of an outer space
dispute not falling under any then-existing treaty provision.217 Also,
since the legal validity2 18 and certainly the wisdom of such reserva-
tions can be questioned, it can certainly be argued that the mere
existence of them constitutes bad faith on the part of those States
having them with respect to the creation of a more rational world
reality. The revocation of such reservations can be done through
the use of a multilateral treaty to insure a unified and reciprocal ef-
fort.
Thirdly, an international panel of experts on scientific and tech-
nological matters relating to outer space should be created to assist
the International Court of Justice or any other international judicial
or regulatory administrative body.
This panel, which could be created presently under the existing
United Nations Charter (at least in relation to the Court) pursuant
to Article 50 of the Statute,2" 9 would be available to advise the court
on such questions of fact requiring expert knowledge which are nec-
essary to the decision of a case (e.g., How much radiation can a per-
son of a given physical type and condition safely stand?).220
Fourth, individuals, corporations, and those international organi-
zations not presently able to invoke the court's jurisdiction should be
given standing to invoke either or both the advisory and contentious
jurisdiction of the court.
Appropriate limitations, of course, could be specified where
deemed necessary. For example, individuals might be given stand-
216. See U.S. Dept. of State, Memorandum Regarding Article XIII of the Inter-
national Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, May 23,
1960 (reprinted in FRIEDMANN, LISSITZYN & PUGH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 289-90 (1969).)
217. See cases cited, supra note 152.
218. See supra note 204.
219. I.C.J. STAT. art. 50 states: "The Court may, at any time, entrust any
individual, body, bureau, commission, or other organization that it may select, with
the task of carrying out an inquiry or giving an expert opinion."
220. The INTELSAT Supplementary Agreement on Arbitration art. 8 provides
the following: "Either at the request of a party, or upon its own initiative, the
tribunal may appoint such experts as it deems necessary to assist it."
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ing only in cases to which they are parties, except in cases involving
human rights, disarmament and arms limitation pursuant to treaties
in force at the time, and in other cases where the issues involved con-
cern the whole world community. The most important point at the
present time is that the International Court of Justice be made avail-
able to more potential parties than just States and selected interna-
tional organizations. 221 The transition of individuals, corporations,
and those international organizations not currently able to invoke the
court's jurisdiction from the status of objects of international law to
subjects of international law can only be considered as consistent
with the increasingly interdependent character of all elements of hu-
man society on the planet Earth.222
The next two proposals are measures which can be adopted at the
present time and do not involve any changes in the present structure
of international law in general and the United Nations Charter ii
particular. For this reason they are to be considered only as com-
promise efforts between the existing international legal reality and
the advanced scheme proposed above.
Initially the 1967 Space Treaty, the 1968 Astronaut Agreement,
and any other treaties concerning outer space by which states would
agree in advance to submit disputes arising out of the interpretation
or application of the treaties' provisions to the International Court of
Justice, unless the states involved in the dispute agree that another
peaceful form of settlement should be adopted.
An example of such a document is the Optional Protocol of Signa-
ture Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, which was
adopted by the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.223
The Protocol provides in Article I that "(d)isputes arising out of the
interpretation or application of any Convention on the Law of the
Sea shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice, and may accordingly be brought before the court
221. See list of such organizations, supra note 157.
222. It has been held by the International Court of Justice that the United
Nations itself is a subject of international law and is capable of possessing inter-
national rights and duties and maintaining those rights by bringing international
claims. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations
[1949] I.C.J. REP. 174, 179.
223. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958; entered into force September 30, 1962,
450 U.N.T.S. 169. The Protocol is not in force for the United States.
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by an application made by any party to the dispute being a Party to
this Protocol."
In addition the use of Articles 26-29 of the current Statute of the
International Court of Justice, which provide special methods of
using the court to decide cases before it, should be considered for
possible application to space disputes.224 For example Article 26(1)
of the Statute allows the court to "from time to time form one or
more chambers, composed of three or more judges as the Court may
determine, for dealing with particular categories (emphasis supplied)
of cases; for example, labor cases and cases relating to transit and
communications."
Under Article 26(1) the court can create a special chamber to
hear cases involving all disputes arising in outer space which the par-
ties refer to it, or only disputes relating to particular areas, such as
liability for space accidents or pollution. Since this proposal is based
upon the current status of the court (and is therefore not to be con-
sidered in relation to or as a preferable alternative to the proposals
above) the court would have to make a finding that the parties have
consented to its jurisdiction for the case in question. In this re-
spect all of the jurisdictional limitations of the court would apply.
If the court found that the parties did consent, however, the decision
would be binding upon them. Also, under section (3) of Article
26, the parties must request that the case be heard by the special
chambers.
Article 29 of the Statute provides that the court "shall form an-
nually a chamber composed of five judges which, at the request of
the parties, may hear and determine cases by summary procedure
(emphasis supplied). In addition, two judges shall be selected for
the purpose of replacing judges who find it impossible to sit." Use
of this Article might be recommended in areas where a relatively
quick decision is needed, as, for example, in disputes involving radio
interference. Again, this proposal is based upon the current status
of the court and is not to be considered in relation to or as a prefer-
able alternative to proposals above.
Article 27 of the Statute simply provides that "(a) judgment given
by any of the chambers provided for in Articles 26 and 29 shall be
224. See Harvey, supra note 157, at 122.
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considered as rendered by the court," and it needs no further ex-
planation or comment.
As to venue Article 28 of the Statute provides that "[t]he chambers
provided for in Articles 26 and 29 may, with the consent of the par-
ties, sit and exercise their functions elsewhere than at The Hague."
This Article, as well as Article 22(1),225 may have particular im-
portance to the question of the proper forum for cases involving lia-
bility disputes.2 6  Generally, the best place to hear a case involving
an accident is the situs, or nearby the situs, as that is where most or
all of the evidence, witnesses, and parties are to be found. As it is
rather absurd to believe that most or all of the incidents occurring
in the future which involve injury to persons and damage to property
on Earth caused by space activities will occur at or near to The
Hague, it is not at all far-fetched to suggest that the members of the
court participating either in the full court or in a special chamber
created pursuant to Article 26 or 29 be transported to the situs of
the accident, rather than the witnesses, parties, and movable evidence
be taken to The Hague, in a case over which the court has jurisdiction.
This is true whether the present status of the court is considered, or
whether an improved status, such as that outlined previously is con-
sidered. If the language of Articles 22(1) and 28 be interpreted
quite literally, furthermore, it is even possible to envision a time
when the members of the court or another international judicial body
will transport to an orbiting space station or possibly a base or colony
located on the moon or some other natural celestial body to hear a
case involving an accident or other event which occurred there, pro-
vided that the members of the court are physically able to make such
a trip and that the facilities of the space station or other outer space
location are adequate to support them for the duration of the litiga-
tion. The rationale for such a procedure would be the same as that
discussed above in relation to moving the members of the court from
the Hague to another location on Earth, namely, economic savings
and nearness to the situs of the accident or other event.
225. Article 22(1): The seat of the Court shall be established at The Hague.
This, however, shall not prevent the Court from sitting and exercising its
functions elsewhere whenever the Court considers it desirable.
226. See LAY & TAUBENFELD, supra note 12, at 160, for a discusison of factors to
consider in choosing a forum for liability cases.
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CONCLUSION
The main purpose of this discussion has been to examine the possi-
bility of using the International Court of Justice to resolve disputes
involving questions of international law which arise in relation to
outer space activities where other peaceful means of settling disputes
have failed. The choice of the court as a basis of discussion was
spawned by the fact that the court is in existence and is ready for
service even without the rather sweeping proposals discussed above,
although it must be again emphasized that the present court, if used
to resolve space cases, can only be regarded as an interim measure
until a more improved system of international adjudication is institu-
tionalized and accepted by the States and international organizations
which may be parties before it. Although it is possible to conceive
of the creation of a new and special international court to handle
space disputes,22 T it has not been necessary to discuss that possibility
separately as both the creation and operation of such a new court
would pose the same basic problems the present International Court
of Justice faces in today's international political reality. To discuss
the nature and limitations of the present court and to suggest im-
provements to it so that it will operate more effectively in the future
with respect to disputes in outer space is, in effect, to discuss the
same basic issues which would be involved in the creation of a new
international court outside of and separate from the present Interna-
tional Court of Justice.
To those who would argue that it is merely an academic exercise
to discuss the International Court of Justice or any other international
court as an instrument by which an improved world reality can be
hewn, due to the fact that there are currently so many limitations
upon international courts, an answer may be provided by the follow-
ing words of Hans Kelsen:
[I]n the field of international relations the majority principle is not applied with
one exception. The exception is extremely significant, however. It is the procedure
of international courts. Here, and here alone, is the majority principle gener-
ally accepted. Submission to the majority vote of an international court is not
227. U.N. CHARTER art. 95 provides the following: "Nothing in the present
Charter shall prevent Members of the United Nations from entrusting the solution
of their differences to other tribunals by virtue of agreements already in existence
or which may be concluded in the future."
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considered incompatible with the sovereignty of the State. This is one of the rea-
sons why it is advisable to make a court, and not a government, the main instru-
ment of international reform. It is the line of least resistance. 2 2
8
228. Kelsen, supra note 51, at 399. In agreement with Kelsen is Paul C. Szasz,
a European oriented scientist-lawyer: "Lawyers, in considering the possibility of
preserving peace through law, naturally often focus their thinking on international
judicial organs. . . . In a sense, the creation of effective judicial organs to settle
international disputes is simpler than the establishment of legislative or executive
ones. Even states that are most reluctant to restrict their nominally uncontrolled
right to determine their international obligations or to participate in the creation of
any international force greater than their own, may be willing to yield to some
extent to judicial organs whose impact is necessarily restricted to the particular
cases under consideration." Szasz, How to Develop World Peace Through Law,
52 AM. B. ASS'N J. 851, 855 (1966).
